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THE CASE AGAINST LIVING PROBATE 
Mary Louise Fe/lows*t 
Living probate proposals have received increasing support in the 
last few years. Living probate enables a testator, prior to his death, 
to adjudicate several legal and factual issues that might be raised in a 
post-mortem will contest. 1 Michigan enacted the first living probate 
statute in 1883,2 but two years later the Michigan Supreme Court 
voided the statute on state constitutional grounds. 3 The idea of liv-
ing probate thereafter lay dormant until the 1930s, when several pro-
ponents, most notably Professor David Cavers, encouraged its 
reconsideration. 4 These commentators• were unable to provoke legis-
lative action. In 1946 the drafters of the Model Probate Code re-
jected living probate, saying that "[t]he practical advantages of such 
a device are not great in view of the fact that few testators would 
wish to encounter the publicity involved in such a proceeding."5 Al-
though the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws continued to study living probate, 6 the idea attracted few 
supporters until the publication of an article by Professor Howard 
Fink in 1976.7 Since that article appeared, Arkansas,8 North Da-
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.B.A. 1970, J.D. 1975, University of 
Michigan. - Ed. 
t I gratefully acknowledge the valuable suggestions of Professors Daniel Farber, Michael 
Graham, John Muench, John Nowak, Lawrence Waggoner, and Dean Peter Hay. 
I. "Living" probate and "ante-mortem" probate are synonymous; I will employ the former 
term throughout this Article. 
2. See Act of Apr. II, 1883, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 17. 
3. See Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 23 N.W. 28 (1885). The court voided 
the statute because it failed to provide for notice to a testator's wife, and because it authorized 
a proceeding beyond the scope of judicial power. The statute required notice be given "heirs,'' 
but the Michigan Supreme Court construed that language as excluding the testator's wife. 
4. See Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, l U. CHI. L. REV. 440 
(1934); Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: Supplementary Procedure Proposed To Reduce Hazards 
of Testamentary .Disposition, 61 TRUST COMPANIES 327 (1935); Kutscher, Living Probate, 21 
A.B.A.J. 427 (1935); Kutscher, Living Probate, 15 MICH. S.B.J. 409 (1936); Redfearn, Ante 
Mortem Probate, 38 CoM. L.J. 571 (1933). The National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws prepared a draft uniform act in 1932. First Tentative Draft of Uniform 
Act To Establish Wills Before Death of Testator, in HANDBOOK OF THE NATL. CONF. OF 
COMMRS. ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE 465 (1932). 
5. MODEL PROBATE CODE, Introduction at 20 (1946). 
6. Professors Eugene F. Scoles and Allan D. Vestal prepared a draft of a uniform ante-
mortem probate statute during their work on the Uniform Probate Code in the 1960s. 
7. See Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited· Can an Idea Have a Life After Death?, 31 
OHIO ST. L.J. 264 (1976). 
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kota,9 and Ohio10 have enacted living probate statutes, and the draft-
ers of the Uniform Probate Code have commenced work on a 
Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate Act. 11 More recently, Professor 
John Langbein and Professors Gregory Alexander and Albert Pear-
son have separately endorsed the idea of living probate. 12 They criti-
cize existing legislation, however, and present alternative theoretical 
and practical approaches to living probate procedure. 
This Article presents the case against living probate in hopes of 
preventing a reform that was appropriately discarded a century ago. 
Part I describes the various living probate proposals, highlighting 
their similarities, differences, and procedural complexities, and the 
benefits they seek to realize. Part II lays out four failings of living 
probate that call the desirability of this reform into question. Fi-
nally, in Part III, I propose an alternative reform which concentrates 
on the underlying problem inspiring living probate proposals - the 
expense and uncertainty of a mental capacity requirement for exe-
cuting a valid will. 
I. LIVING PROBATE PROPOSALS 
In recent years scholars have advanced three different living pro-
bate proposals: Professor Fink advocates a "Contest Model"13 for 
living probate procedure, Professor Langbein advocates a "Conser-
vatorship Model," and Professors Alexander and Pearson advocate 
an "Administrative Model." Although the procedural differences 
between these models are significant, all three proposals envision the 
same limited scope of inquiry at living probate, and all attempt to 
reap the same benefits: improving the evidence of testamentary ca-
pacity and protecting testamentary freedom. 
The various proposals for living probate statutes reflect nearly 
identical views of the proper scope of inquiry during living probate 
8. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-2134 to -2137 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
9. SeeN.D. CENT. Cooe §§ 30.1-08.1-01 to -04 (Supp. 1979). 
IO. See OHIO Rev. CODE ANN.§§ 2107.081 to .085 (Page Supp. 1979). 
11. SeeNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, JOINT 
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, UNIFORM ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE 
ACT (3d Working Draft, April 18, 1978). At the Summer 1979 meeting of the NCCUSL, it 
approved the formation of a new drafting committee for a Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate Act. 
The Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code will also cooperate on this project. 
A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST LAW, 8 PROB. & PROP., at 17 (1980). 
12. See Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 11 MICH. L. Rev. 63 
(1978); Alexander, The Conservatorship Model· A Mod!ftcation, 11 MICH. L. REV. 86 (1978); 
Alexander & Pearson, Alternative Models of Ante-Mortem Probate and Procedural .Due Process 
Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L. Rev. 89 (1979). 
13. Professor Langbein, and not Professor Fink, selected this label. See Langbein, supra 
note 12, at 63. 
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proceedings. In each model, the proceeding is limited to the issues of 
compliance with will execution formalities (e.g., signature of testator, 
number of witnesses attesting and signing the will), testamentary ca-
pacity, and undue influence. In other words, living probate would 
determine the validity of the testamentary instrument, but would not 
interpret its contents. 
Deciding questions of compliance with will execution formalities 
during ante-mortem inquiry appears justified, but that advantage 
alone hardly justifies living probate. Adjudication of these questions 
can correct errors in will execution, thereby assuring the testator that 
the will is secure against attack for failure to comply with the formal-
ities. This advantage is slight because only testators who have re-
tained an attorney will make use of living probate proceedings, and 
attorneys rarely have had problems with execution formalities in re-
cent years. 14 Moreover, substantial Uniform Probate Code reforms 
already enable a testator to make sure that he has complied with 
execution formalities. The testator and the witnesses need only sign 
affidavits and complete certain procedures before a notary public (or 
any other officer authorized to administer oaths) to raise an irrebut-
table presumption of compliance.15 I am suggesting not that ques-
tions of compliance with execution formalities should be excluded 
from living probate inquiry, 16 but only that this inquiry alone cannot 
justify creating this proceeding. 
Construction of the contents of a will falls outside the scope of 
ante-mortem inquiry for several reasons. First, although the testi-
mony of the testator would frequently help to resolve ambiguities 
and questions about a particular disposition, just as the attorney 
drafting the instrument failed to identify troublesome dispository 
language, the judge and the other parties may also overlook trouble-
14. The estate planning literature contains step-by-step procedures to ensure the validity of 
a will throughout the United States. See, e.g., A.J. CASNER, EsTATE PLANNING 86-90 (4th ed. 
1979); J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND EsTATES 285-87 (2d ed. 1978); J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' EsTATES AND TRUSTS 164-66 (5th ed. 1977). 
15. Setr UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§§ 2-504, 3-406(b). As opposed to establishing a conclu-
sive presumption of compliance with certain formalities, the drafters could have merely pro-
vided that a will accompanied by signed affidavits meets all necessary procedural formalities. 
Such a statute would eliminate any possible allegations of a violation of procedural due proc-
ess based on the use of conclusive presumptions. In any case, the statute would withstahd 
constitutional attack on substantive due process grounds and should lead to the elimination of 
unnecessary litigation at probate. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNO, HANDBOOK ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497-98 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1092-97 
(1978). 
16. In fact, the self-proved will promulgated by the UPC could be adopted in conjunction 
with the living probate proceeding and made a prerequisite to presenting the will to living 
probate. 
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some dispository language. Second, the proceeding could be length-
ened and complicated unnecessarily while the parties resolve 
ambiguities that may never be relevant or important. Perhaps the 
parties should be able to raise construction questions, but should not 
be barred from litigating the issue later because of a failure to raise 
the issue in ante-mortem proceedings. Because of my fundamental 
criticisms of living probate in general, however, I do not discuss the 
merits of this possible expansion of the scope of the inquiry in this 
Article. 
Inexplicably, issues concerning fraudulent interference in will ex-
ecution (other than the question of undue influence) are also ex-
cluded from the living probate proceedings.17 In this Article, I will 
address the application of living probate proceedings to allegations 
of fraud. 
Proponents of each of the three living probate models foresee two 
advantages in its use. First, living probate could improve the fact-
finding process in will contests involving allegations of mental inca-
pacity, fraud, or undue influence by providing the testator the oppor-
tunity to testify. In such cases, the testator's state of mind and intent 
are determinative issues.18 The availability of the testator for ques-
tioning eliminates the need to rely exclusively upon the testator's ob-
served and reported actions. 19 The fact-finding process is further 
improved because the litigation occurs near the time of execution of 
the will, which is the critical time of inquiry in determining the will's 
validity.20 This evidentiary advantage provides a strong argument 
'for enacting a living probate statute. 
Second, living probate proposals promote testamentary freedom 
17. The Michigan statute enacted in 1883 included fraud within the scope of its proceed-
ings. See Act of Apr. 11, 1883, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 17, § 2. 
18. See, e.g., Parrisella v. Fotopulos, 111 Ariz. 4, 522 P.2d 1081 (1974) (undue influence); 
Estate ofFritschi, 60 Cal 2d 367,384 P.2d.656, 33 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1963) (testamentary capac-
ity); In re Estate of Newhall, 190 Cal. 709, 214 P. 231 (1923) (fraud); In re Anderson Estate, 
353 Mich. 169, 91 N.W.2d 356 (1958) (testamentary capacity). See generallyT. ATKINSON, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS§§ 51-52 (testamentary capacity), 55 (undue influence), 56 
(fraud) (2d ed. 1953); w. BOWE & D. PARK.ER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS§§ 12.21 (testa-
mentary capacity), 14.3-.4, 14.6 (fraud), 15.3, 15.5-.6 (undue influence) (rev. 'ed. 1960). 
19. For examples of cases relying on observable and reportable actions of the testator to 
determine testamentary capacity, see Estate of Kirk, 161 Cal. App. 2d 145, 326 P.2d 151 (1958); 
In re Estate of Strittmater, 140 N.J. Eq. 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947); Hickman v. Hickman, 244 
S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), error ref. n.r.e. In addition, see Note, Eccentricities and 
Testamentary Capacity, 46 DICK. L. REv. 254 (1942). 
20. See Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cal. 2d 571,241 P.2d 990 (1952) (testamentary capacity); 
In re Estate of Ricks, 160 Cal. 450, 117 P. 532 (1911) (fraud); Boland v. Aycock, 191 Ga. 327, 
12 S.E.2d 319 (1940) (undue influence); Downey v. Lawley, 377 Ill. 298, 36 N.E.2d 341 (1941) 
(undue influence); Montgomery v. Willbanks, 202 S.W.2d 851 (fex. Civ. App. 1947) (fraud); 
Estate of O'Loughlin, 50 Wis. 2d 143, 183 N.W.2d 133 (1971) (testamentary capacity). 
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by offering the testator greater assurance that his dispository scheme 
will be carried out. In post-mortem probate, courts often substitute 
their own view of a fair dispository scheme for that of the testator by 
finding that the testator's scheme is abnormal.21 Abnormality of the 
dispository scheme bears on determinations of testamentary capac-
ity, fraud, and undue influence. When a court investigates testamen-
tary capacity, the dispository scheme provides information about the 
testator's state of mind at the time of execution.22 When a court in-
vestigates fraud or undue influence, the dispository scheme may 
prove critical in determining whether the wrongful conduct affected 
the contents of the will.23 Obviously, the more atypical the distribu-
tion, the more vulnerable the will to claims of mental incapacity, 
fraud, or undue influence. 24 But many courts fail to recognize that a 
finding that a disposition is "abnormal" should mean that the dispo-
21. See Green, Prop/ of Menial Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 
YALE L.J. 271 (1944). In addition, see Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and 
Family Maintenance: A Proposal for Meaningful Reform, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 231 (1962); Comment, 
A Case Against Admilling into Evidence the .Disposilive Elements of a Will in a Conies/ Based on 
Testamentary Incapacity, 2 CONN. L. REv. 616 (1970). 
22. See In re Estate of Arnold, 16 Cal. 2d 573, 107 P.2d 25 (1940); In re Estate of Jensen, 
185 Minn. 284, 240 N.W. 656 (1932); Keen's Estate, 299 Pa. 430, 149 A. 737 (1930). The courts 
substantially agree on the legal standard of mental capacity necessary for execution of a will. 
The testator must have at the time of execution of the will the ability to know and understand: 
(1) The nature and extent of the testator's property; (2) the persons who are the natural objects 
of the testator's bounty; and (3) the disposition the testator is making of his property. In addi-
tion, the testator must also have the capacity to appreciate these concepts in relation to each 
other, and to form an orderly desire as to the disposition of his property. E.g., Estate ofFrit-
schi, 60 Cal. 2d 367, 384 P.2d 656, 33 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1963); In re Anderson Estate, 353 Mich, 
169, 91 N.W.2d 356 (1958); Hall Will, 402 Pa. 212, 166 A.2d 644 (1961). 
23. The elements necessary to prove fraud are: (1) misrepresentation or suppression of a 
material fact; (2) known to be false by the person making the misrepresentation at the time it 
was made; (3) made for the purpose of inducing the decedent to act in reliance thereon; (4) 
action by the decedent in reliance on the misrepresentation or suppression of fact; (5) injury to 
the decedent or another resulting from the induced action. See, e.g., Kyle v. Pate, 222 Ark. 4, 
257 S.W.2d 34 (1953); Franklin v. Belt, 130 Ga. 37, 60 S.E. 146 (1908); Roblin v. Shantz, 210 
Or. 371, 31 I P.2d 459 (1957); Stirk's Estate, 232 Pa. 98, 81 A. 187 (1911); In re Dand's Estate, 
41 Wash. 2d 158, 247 P.2d 1016 (1952). 
Undue influence is defined as conduct that destroys the free agency of the decedent and 
substitutes the decedent's testamentary wishes for those of another. Although the instrument is 
executed by the decedent and all apparent formalities are present, the will or a part of the will 
is a product of a captive mind, and, consequently, testamentary intent is so lacking that the will 
is invalid. Parrisella v. Fotopulos, 111 Ariz. 4, 522 P.2d 1081 (1974); Estate of Franco, 50 Cal. 
App. 3d 374, 123 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1975); In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1971); 
Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105,416 P.2d 164 (1966); Breault v. Feigenholtz, 54 Ill. 2d 173, 
296 N.E.2d 3 (1973). Specific factors considered in finding a causal connection between undue 
influence and the testamentary disposition include consideration of an apparently unnatural or 
unjust dispository scheme that can be explained by influential conduct by a legatee or by one 
who is interested in benefiting the legatee. See Estate of Teal, 255 Cal. 2d 520, 154 P.2d 384 
(1945); Estate of Peters, 9 Cal. App. 3d 916, 88 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1971); In re Will of Fenwick, 
348 A.2d 12 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1975). 
24. See Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, supra note 4, at 442-43. 
In addition, see Fink, supra note 7, at 265 n.l for a description of unreported cases in which 
the critical factor-was an unnatural distribution. 
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sition appears unnatural for the particular testator. Instead, probate 
judges find a dispository scheme abnormal when they feel a contest-
ant has been unfairly excluded from a share of the testator's 
bounty.25 Living probate discourages judges from invalidating a will 
25. See M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 184-88 
(1970); Cavers, supra note 4, at 441-43; Fink, supra note 7, at 265-66; Langbein, supra note 12, 
at 66. See also Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6 STAN. L. RE.v. 91, 92 (1953) (noting that juries 
find for the contestant in the majority of cases in California). The courts' inclinations to sub-
stitute their own views of a dispository scheme for that of the testator and the dangers of such a 
jurisprudence were perhaps best stated in 1876 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72, 77-78 (1876): 
The growing disposition of courts and juries to set aside last wills and testaments, and to 
substitute in lieu thereof their own notions as to what a testator should do with his prop-
erty, is not to be encouraged. No right of the citizen is more valued than the power to 
dispose of his property by will .... It rarely happens that a man bequeaths his estate to 
the entire satisfaction of either his family or friends. In many instances testamentary dis-
positions of property seem harsh, if not unjust, the result, perhaps, of prejudice as to some 
of the testator's kindred, or undue partiality as to others. But these are matters about 
which we have no concern. The law wisely secures equality of distribution where a man 
dies intestate. But the very object of a will is to produce inequality . . . . It is doubtless 
true that narrow prejudice sometimes interferes with the wisdom of such arrangements 
. . . . It must be remembered that in this country a man's prejudices are a part of his 
liberty. He has a right to them; he may be unjust to his children or relatives; he is entitled 
to the control of his property while living, and by will to direct its use after his death, 
subject only to such restrictions as are imposed by law. 
For examples of the improper standard of abnormality, compare Estate of Goetz, 253 Cal. 
App. 2d 107, 61 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1967), with Rizzo v. D'Ambrosia, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 837, 310 
N.E.2d 925 (1974). In Estate of Goetz, evidence showing that the decedent erroneously sus-
pected her husband of trying to poison her and of mistreating her led neither the jury nor the 
California Court of Appeal to invalidate a will which excluded her husband. In contrast, a 
Massachusetts court in Rizzo affirmed a verdict holding a will invalid based on testimony that 
at the time the will was executed, the testator suffered from the delusion that his niece was 
poisoning him. In the Goetz case the delusion was disregarded but in Rizzo it was of critical 
importance. The best, and perhaps only, explanation for the difference in results can be found 
in the respective courts' views concerning what constituted a proper disposition under the cir-
cumstances of the case. Never identifying the beneficiaries under the proffered will, the Rizzo 
court stated: 
Here, the decedent's delusion that he was being poisoned by his niece concerned the very 
person who, as she had been rendering him daily care and assistance for more than ten 
years, would seem to have had the greatest claim to his bounty. 
2 Mass. App. at 838, 310 N.E.2d at 926 (emphasis added). 
The Goetz court, when addressing the allegation of undue influence, indicated its view as to 
naturalness of the disposition 
It was, indeed, entirely natural that testatrix should consider that in view of her husband's 
advanced years he would have an ample amount, . . . . Mrs. Goetz' husband and her son . 
had not been on good terms and it is unlikely that the husband would have left anything to 
the respondent. 
253 Cal. App. 2d at 107, 118, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 181, 188 (emphasis added). Both courts imposed 
their own determinations of a fair and reasonable disposition of the decedent's property in 
light of the relationship between the testator and the litigants, the financial dependency of each 
litigant upon the testator, and the contributions of each litigant to the welfare of the testator. 
Accord, In re Estate of Coles, 205 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Adams v. Calia, 433 
S.W.2d 661 (Ky. 1968); See generally Epstein, supra note 21, at 238-49; Green, supra note 21, 
at 277-81, 298-311; Note, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell; A Psychiatric Reevaluation, 18 
STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1129, 1130-31, 1141-43 (1966). 
Bequests to nonprofit organizations viewed as unworthy of financial support suffer fre-
quent attack. In the case of In re Strittmater's Estate, 140 N.J. Eq. 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947), a 49 
year-old decedent, who was survived by some cousins whom she saw only infrequently during 
the last few years of her life, left her entire estate to the National Women's Party. Her mem-
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despite insubstantial evidence of incapacity, fraud, or undue influ-
ence. The testator's presence and ability to testify would inhibit reli-
ance by the court on its view of "fairness" in the dispository scheme 
to resolve these issues.26 
bership in the organization spanned over nineteen years. The court relied on memoranda 
written by the testator six years before she executed the will to find that she harbored an insane 
hatred for men. Although the testator's business dealings with her male attorney and male 
banker were entirely reasonable and normal, the court attributed the inconsistency to her "split 
personality." The Court concluded that her psychosis caused her to leave her estate to the 
National Women's Party, and it therefore invalidated the will. 
In contrast, in Jones v. South Dakota Children's Home Society, 238 N.W.2d 677 (S.D, 
1947), an 85-year-old decedent, who had previously suffered a stroke, executed a will revoking 
a prior will that contained substantial bequests to collateral relatives and substituting bequests 
to charities including a crippled children's hospital, a boys' ranch, a boys' home, and a town-
ship. The court held that the decedent possessed sufficient mental capacity to execute the will. 
The court reasoned that the testator was justified in revoking the bequests to his relatives 
because they were in part responsible both for the imposition of a guardianship over his estate 
and for the subsequent sale of his property. The court also refused to rely on the evidence 
concerning the decedent's weakened mental state that did not relate to the specific time frame 
in which the decedent executed the will. The court rejected the argument that leaving the 
property to a government was evidence of the decedent's incompetence. 
The court in Strillmater was dealing with an insane delusion. Therefore, focusing on the 
particular disposition was justified because the legal issue was whether the insane delusion 
affected any part of the dispository scheme. The finding of an insane delusion in Strittmater, 
however, seems irreconcilable with Jones. Perhaps the best explanation for the different re-
sults is found in the courts' views as to the worthiness of the respective beneficiaries named in 
the wills. 
The imposition of the court's view of a natural disposition is not limited to cases alleging 
testamentary incapacity, but includes cases in which fraud or undue influence is at issue. See, 
e.g., In re Estate of Gelonese, 36 Cal. App. 3d 854, 111 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1974). In Gelonese, the 
decedent bequeathed substantially larger shares of her estate to three of her children than to 
the other two. The two disfavored children contested probate of the will on the grounds that 
the will was procured by fraud and undue influence. A jury held that a presumption of undue 
influence had been established by the disfavored children upon showing a confidential rela-
tionship between the decedent and the favored children, active participation in the execution 
of the will by these children, and undue benefit to them. The jury also held that the propo-
nents of the will had failed to rebut that presumption. The appellate court affirmed the jury 
verdict that the will was procured through the undue influence of the favored children: 
[T]here can be no question that this element was established by substantial evidence, The 
will war an unnatural one in that it did not treat all of decedent's children equally • • • . In 
the light of the evidence, although in conflict, that decedent wanted her children to share 
equally in her estate, [three of the children] would receive substantially more under the 
will than [two other children]. 
36 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis added). 
In contrast, in Burke v. Thomas, 282 Ala. 412, 21 So. 2d 903 (1968), the court did not find 
that a beneficiary's active involvement in the execution of the will and the decedent's depen-
dency upon the beneficiary for care raised an inference of undue influence. A distant relative 
had moved into the decedent's home for the purpose of caring for her during her illness. With-
out sufficient income to pay for her care, the decedent instead promised to leave the relative all 
of her property. The relative and the decedent asked an attorney to draft such a will, and the 
relative was present during the will's execution. The beneficiary under a prior will alleged 
undue influence and testamentary incapacity. The jury found the will valid, and the Supreme 
Court of Alabama affirmed their decision. The Burke court found that the care provided by 
the relative explained the bequest. 
Like the mental competency cases, the Gelonese and Burke decisions can be best rational-
ized by looking not to the differences in the quality or the nature of the evidence showing 
undue influence, but, rather, to the courts perception of the fairness of the disposition. 
26. Of course, many courts realize the danger of considering the fairness of a dispository 
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Living probate therefore draws its usefulness entirely from the 
testator's presence and testimony. The presence of the testator at a 
living probate proceeding serves both society's interest in accurate 
factual determinations on issues relating to will validity and the tes-
tator's interest in preventing courts from judging the "fairness" of his 
testamentary disposition. 
A. The Contest Model 
Professor Howard Fink proposed this model for living probate in 
1976, and it has subsequently been enacted in Arkansas, North Da-
kota, and Ohio. The Contest Model envisions an adversarial pro-
ceeding that results in a declaratory judgment on issues of 
testamentary capacity, compliance with execution formalities, and 
undue influence. The parties to the proceeding include expectant 
heirs and beneficiaries of the proffered will. 27 In sum, the Contest 
Model changes only the timing of the litigation; otherwise the pro-
ceeding is essentially identical to a post-mortem will contest. 
Because the Contest Model changes only the timing of the adju-
dication, it imposes substantial hardships on the testator and on the 
expectant heirs and beneficiaries of any will revoked by the proffered 
will. The testator loses the benefits of a confidential testamentary 
disposition during his life. Family harmony is seriously threatened 
since family members learn of unfavorable dispositions before the 
testator's death. The expectant heirs28 and beneficiaries of prior 
wills affected by the proffered will (hereinafter both classes of per-
sons are referred to as presumptive takers) must bear litigation costs 
early although their inheritance remains uncertain until the testator's 
death. To take, they must not only survive the testator, but they also 
risk that the testator will consume or otherwise dispose of the prop-
erty before his death. Beneficiaries under the proffered will who re-
ceive less than their intestate succession share, or less than the 
bequests made to them under a prior will, may abstain from litigat-
ing for fear that if they lose, the testator will execute a new will disin- · 
scheme and refuse to invalidate a will on that basis. See, e.g., Jackson's Exr. v. Semones, 266 
Ky. 352, 98 S.W.2d 505 (1936); Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Berry, 93 Md. 560, 49 A. 401 
(1901); In re Estate of Martin, l Or. App. 260,457 P.2d 662 (1969); In re So=erville's Estate, 
406 Pa. 207, 177 A.2d 496 (1962). 
27. Professor Fink's proposal mistakenly omitted beneficiaries of prior wills affected by the 
proffered will from the list of parties to the living probate proceeding. The three statutes pres-
ently enacted also omit these persons. 
28. The term "expectant heirs" refers to those persons who would take under the intestate 
succession statute if the testator were to die i=ediately before living probate proceedings 
were commenced. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2136 (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 30.1-08.1-02 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.081-.085 (Page Supp. 1979). 
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heriting them entirely. Moreover, fickle testators who frequently 
change their wills could repeatedly confront family members with 
the dilemma of whether to contest each proffered will in ante-
mortem proceedings. All these disadvantages of the Contest Model 
have led proponents of living probate to propose modifications in 
order to alleviate the hardships imposed upon both the testator and 
the presumptive takers. 
B. The Conservatorship Model 
I 
Professor John Langbein proposes to reduce the family tensions 
living probate might create, and to improve the litigating posture of 
the will contestants, through the appointment of a guardian ad litem 
to represent all persons whose property interests might suffer from 
an ante-mortem finding that a will is valid. Langbein refers to his 
proposed scheme as the Conservatorship Model. The procedure 
duplicates the adversarial and adjudicative format of the Contest 
Model. The testator would petition the court with probate jurisdic-
tion for a declaratory judgment that his will was obtained without 
undue influence and that he possessed testamentary capacity at the 
time of execution. A copy of the executed will would accompany the 
petition. To assure adequate preliminary counseling, proper draft-
ing and execution of the will, and prevention of frivolous proceed-
ings, the Conservatorship Model would require that the testator be 
represented by an attorney. The presumptive takers and benefi-
ciaries of the proffered will would receive notice and an opportunity 
to appear at the living probate proceeding. In addition, the court 
would appoint a guardian ad litem to represent all persons whose 
property interests might suffer from a finding that the testator pos-
sessed testamentary capacity or was free from undue influence. The 
testator would bear the reasonable expenses incurred by the guard-
ian ad litem.29 Thus, persons with potential interests in invalidating 
the will could decline to contest the testator's suit in their own 
names, while continuing to be represented by the guardian ad litem. 
Professor Langbein suggests that the guardian ad litem reduces 
living probate's disruption of family harmony. The presumptive tak-
ers "would be able to communicate any relevant information or sus-
picions to the guardian ad litem in confidence, without having to 
take actions hostile to the testator."30 According to Professor 
Langbein, 
29. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 79. 
30. Id at 78. 
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[The Conservatorship Model] would permit full development and ven-
tilation of evidence of incapacity without requiring family members to 
step forward and assert that the testator lacked capacity. Those posi-
tions adverse to the testator would be developed, but not in the exag-
gerated mold of adversary contest, which has such unpleasant 
implications for family harmony and for the human values at stake.31 
Langbein also predicts that the guardian ad litem would better pro-
tect the interests of unborn or unascertained heirs, as well as those 
presumptive takers who calculate that benefits of invalidating the 
pro.ff ered will are too remote to justify litigating. 32 
While I will describe the flaws of living probate at some length 
below, I feel compelled to challenge one feature of the Conservator-
ship Model at the outset. I doubt that employing a guardian ad litem 
will preserve the family harmony threatened by a living probate pro-
ceeding. Placing the guardian ad litem as a buffer between the pre-
sumptive takers and the testator achieves little. To represent fully 
presumptive takers, the guardian ad litem will necessarily rely on 
information the presumptive takers provide. He will obtain docu-
ments from them, take their depositions, and investigate their suspi-
cions. The testator and others who want the will upheld are very 
likely to recognize the sources of information used to challenge the 
will. Although Langbein envisions an informal proceeding in which 
the evidence would be presented in a nonadversarial context without 
the use of a jury, the proceeding remains adjudicative, and opposing 
testimony will still be presented. 33 In essence, the proceeding is both 
adversarial and potentially acrimonious. 
C. The Administrative Model 
Professor Gregory Alexander's doubts about the adequacy of 
Langbein's proposals eventually led him to construct the Adminis-
trative Model for living probate. Alexander believes that a living 
probate scheme will not be viable unless testators can keep their tes-
tamentary dispositions confidential. At first, Alexander proposed to 
preserve confidentiality by providing the testator a living probate 
procedure in which the presumptive takers would receive no notice 
or opportunity to appear, and only a guardian ad litem would inves-
tigate the issues of testamentary capacity and undue in:fiuence.34 In 
31. Id at 79. 
32. Id 
33. See id at 75-76, 80-81. 
34. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 91. As the representative of presumptive takers in-
cluding unborn or unascertained heirs, the guardian ad !item would provide information about 
the mental capacity of the testator and about whether the will was obtained free from undue 
influence. 
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electing to preserve confidentiality, the testator would sacrifice the 
certainty provided by the Conserv~torship Model. Any declaratory 
judgment issued would create only a presumption of validity that 
could be challenged in a subsequent post-mortem contest.35 Alexan-
der envisioned that both the Conservatorship Model and this "non-
binding option" would be available to the testator. 
A year after proposing this "nonbinding option," Alexander de-
cided that the ante-mortem declaratory judgment should be binding 
even absent notice and a hearing for presumptive takers. Writing 
with Professor Albert Pearson, Alexander developed a plan for an ex 
parte living probate proceeding in which only a guardian. ad litem 
would appear. Because the proposal envisions an administrative-
type proceeding rather than an adversarial one, Alexander and Pear-
son label it the "Administrative Model."36 
Unlike the Conservatorship Model or the "nonbinding option," 
the Administrative Model's guardian ad litem would not represent 
the presumptive takers or the beneficiaries of the proffered will, but 
would function more as a civil prosecutor or special master account-
able to the court.37 Initially, the testator would petition the appro-
priate court for a declaration that the will was duly executed and 
that the testator possessed testamentary capacity and was free from 
undue influence. Although the will would accompany the petition, 
only the judge could inspect it.38 If the court believed that the will 
contained unusual provisions, it could alert the guardian ad litem to 
inquire into specific matters without disclosing the terms.39 The 
guardian ad !item would have the responsibility of interviewing the 
35. If the court determined, after considering the evidence provided by the guardian ad 
!item, questioning the testator, and reviewing the proffered will, that the testator possessed 
testamentary capacity and was free from undue influence, it would issue a declaratory judg-
ment establishing a presumption of will validity for purposes of any post-mortem contest. To 
make this option more attractive, Alexander proposes that the presumption of validity could 
only be overcome by evidence establishing probable cause for invalidation that the guardian 
ad litem did not present in the ante-mortem proceeding. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 92. 
This presumption is stronger than the rebuttable presumption of validity with respect to issues 
of testamentary capacity, fraud, and undue influence created under the Uniform Probate Code 
for self-proved wills. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 3-406. But doubt remains whether the 
strength of the presumption would decrease strike suits enough to justify the administrative 
burden on the courts and the increased burden on testators; Langbein asserts that it would not. 
See Langbein, supra note 12, at 77-78 n.50. 
36. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 111-12. This proposal is very similar to the one 
proposed by Cavers in 1934. See Cavers, supra note 4, at 445-47. 
37. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 113-14. Because the guardian ad litem only 
functions as an investigator for the court, the "guardian" label chosen by Alexander and Pear-
son is probably inappropriate; it will be used in this Article solely to avoid confusion. 
38. Id. at 113. 
39. Id. at 114. 
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testator ( outside the presence of the attorney who drafted the will), 
members of the testator's family, and others who know the testator 
well. Based on these interviews the guardian ad litem would report 
his determination of the issues to the court. 40 The trier of fact would 
then make binding determinations on the issues of testamentary ca-
pacity and undue influence. 
Like the Conservatorship Model, the Administrative Model still 
would disrupt family harmony. After interviews by the guardian ad 
litem, family members will likely grow curious as to the contents of 
the will. Although Alexander and Pearson do not suggest this, pre-
sumably the testator may waive the no-notice and restrictive proce-
dures. If so, the secret procedure becomes elective and the testator's 
failure to waive confidentiality may fuel unpleasant suspicions 
among family members. 
D. Unresolved Issues 
Before leaving this discussion of the living probate proposals, 
three unresolved procedural issues require discussion so that the 
reader has a more complete understanding of the complexity of liv-
ing probate. Below I describe the thorny issues of appealability of a 
living probate decree, collateral effect of a living probate decree, and 
revocability of a will validated by living probate. 
Parties to a living probate proceeding could _appeal a finding of 
validity or invalidity of a will.41 Difficulties will arise, however, in 
defining the duty of a guardian ad litem to pursue an appeal under 
the Conservatorship or Administrative Model. If the testator dies 
before the parties have exhausted their opportunities for appeal, the 
distribution of the estate will await a final order. Once a final order 
upholding the will has been issued, all the living probate proposals 
contemplate that it will bind those persons who had notice of the 
proceeding. The Administrative Model, of course, would bind even 
those persons who were not notified of the proceeding. 
The literature contains little discussion of the collateral effect of a 
final ante-mortem order holding the proffered will invalid.42 The 
proponents of living probate have concerned themselves more with 
the binding effect on presumptive takers of an order upholding the 
40. Id at 114. 
41. See OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 2107.084 (Page Supp. 1979). 
42. Professor Fink recommended that a limitation be placed on the use in subsequent pro-
ceedings of the facts found in the ante-mortem proceeding so as to eliminate a testator's fear 
"that by instituting a proceeding to determine his testamentary capacity he runs the risk that 
an unfavorable verdict or unfavorable findings could be detrimental (or even determinative) in 
a future proceeding testing his mental capacity." Fink, supra note 7, at 277. 
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will. Under the Contest and Conservatorship Models, an order from 
an ante-mortem probate proceeding holding a will invalid binds the 
legatees because they were made parties to the proceeding. If the 
testator re-executes the will after the final order of invalidity, or if 
the testator executes another will containing different dispositions, 
the final order and other findings of fact from the proceeding are 
admissible evidence at a later living probate proceeding or at a post-
mortem probate will contest.43 Res judicata does not apply to this 
latter case because the issue presented there is whether the testator 
possessed testamentary capacity or was free from fraud or undue in-
fluence when the second execution occurred. Nevertheless, a prior 
finding of testamentary incapacity will bear on whether the testator 
possessed testamentary capacity at a later time. A prior finding of 
fraud or undue influence with respect to a prior will is likely to be 
given less weight even if the dispositions are nearly identical because 
the same instances of wrongful conduct are less likely to affect the 
second execution by the testator. The contestants to the will must 
offer evidence of further wrongful conduct or continuing wrongful 
conduct at the time of the subsequent execution in order to have the 
second will declared invalid. 
Similar questions arise under the Administrative Model. Argua-
bly, presumptive takers should benefit from a finding of invalidity if 
the same will is presented at a post-mortem will contest because the 
testator already enjoyed an opportunity to prove the validity of the 
will. The difficult issue, however, is whether the testator satisfac-
torily represents the legatees named in the proffered will. The lega-
tees' interests, in a sense, derive from that of the testator, and when 
43. See N.D. CENT. CODE§ 30.1-08.1-04 (Supp. 1979); OHIO Rev. CODE ANN.§ 2107.085 
(Page Supp. 1979); Fink, supra note 7, at 275. Both Fink's living probate proposal and the 
North Dakota statute contain redundant language: 
The facts found in a proceeding brought under this [section/chapter] shall not be admissi-
ble in evidence in any proceeding other than one brought in (this state/North Dakota] to 
determine the validity of a will; nor shall the determination in a proceeding under this 
chapter be binding, upon the parties to such proceeding, in any action not brought to 
determine the validity of a will. 
Fink, supra note 7, at 275; N.D. CENT. CODE§ 30.1-08 .l-04 (Supp. 1979). The second phrase 
does not seem to provide any additional limitation on the use of the facts found in the proceed-
ing, although in his explanation of the provision, Fink implies that two issues are involved: 
[T]he proposed statute provides that facts found in a proceeding under the statute are not 
admissible in evidence in actions other than for the determination of the validity of a will, 
and that the determination in such a statutory proceeding shall not be binding for collat-
eral estoppel purposes upon the parties in other actions not involving the determination of 
the validity of a will. 
Fink, supra note 7, at 277. 
The drafters of the Ohio statute eliminated the last phrase; perhaps they, too, found the lan-
guage redundant. In any, case, the use of the indefinite article in all of these statutes suggests 
that the drafters contemplated that the findings of fact would be admissible into evidence in 
litigation concerning the validity of a subsequent will. 
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so viewed, they should be bound by any order that binds the testator. 
If legatees could use a finding of validity against the presumptive 
takers, even though the legatees have not suffered litigation costs, 
presumptive takers should benefit from a finding of invalidity. On 
the other hand, because the Administrative Model does not require 
presumptive takers personally to litigate the issues, they have not in-
curred litigation costs and thus, arguably, they are not unfairly hurt 
if they cannot bind the legatees of the proffered will. to a finding of 
invalidity. In any case, just as in the Contest Model or Conservator-
ship Model, if a testator re-executes the same will or drafts another 
will with different provisions, a living probate finding that a prior 
will was invalid should be admissible into evidence. 
Allowing a living probate finding of invalidity to bind the testa-
tor and the legatees (and admitting that finding in contests over sub-
sequently executed wills) may deter the use of the living probate 
proceeding. Nevertheless, this apparent disadvantage of living pro-
bate should not be removed; it will properly deter the use of the pro-
cedure in cases where questions of testamentary incapacity, fraud, or 
undue influence should legitimately be raised. Moreover, judges 
might be more reluctant to make a binding determination of will 
validity and preclude any further litigation by persons adversely af-
fected by the will if they know that a finding of invalidity will have 
no binding effect on either the beneficiaries under the will or the 
presumptive takers. 
In contrast to their silence on collateral effects, proponents of liv-
ing probate have carefully addressed issues concerning the appropri-
ate manner for totally or partially revoking a court-approved will. 
They have suggested three alternative approaches to revocation. 
Langbein argues that the formalities for revocation should be the 
same for court-approved wills as they are for other types of wills.44 
Arkansas has adopted this proposition.45 Fink argues that the testa-
tor should be required to petition the court to revoke or modify a 
will it approved in a previous living probate proceeding.46 North 
Dakota has adopted this proposition.47 Alexander and Pearson pro-
pose a compromise; the testator could revoke by submitting notice of 
the revocation to the court.48 
44. Langbein, supra note 12, at 81. 
45. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2137 {Cum. Supp. 1979). The Ohio statute provides for 
revocation either under court supervision or under the conventional revocation statute. See 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.084(C)-(D) (Page Supp. 1979). 
46. Fink, supra note 7, at 276-77. 
47. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE§ 30.1-08.1-03 {Supp. 1979). 
48. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 119. 
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Alexander and Pearson's approach to revocability seems to be 
the most appropriate. Requiring court approval of a subsequent rev-
ocation or modification of the will eliminates post-mortem allega-
tions of revocation or of incapacity, fraud, and undue influence with 
respect to a revocation. Requiring a court proceeding, however, 
seems to restrain unjustifiably a testator's freedom to modify or re-
voke an existing testamentary scheme. Since virtually all testators 
who use the living probate proceeding would obtain the advice of an 
attorney, they would usually know the risks of an informal revoca-
tion and could prudently decide whether to institute further proceed-
ings. Requiring mere notice to the court eliminates the possibility of 
unfounded or erroneous allegations that the court-approved will has 
been revoked without imposing another costly and time-consuming 
procedure on the testator. Although requiring notice increases the 
risk that an otherwise valid revocation must go unrecognized, the 
protection against unfounded allegations of revocation probably 
makes that risk worthwhile. 
II. THE FAILINGS OF LIVING PROBATE 
The case against living probate can be rested on any of several 
flaws in the Contest, Conservatorship, and Administrative Models. 
First, the proposals will fail to achieve their own stated objectives of 
improving the evidence available during probate and assuring testa-
tors that their dispository schemes will be carried out. Second, all 
three proposals make the testator pay a high price for these ephem-
eral advantages, Finally, and perhaps most important, all three pro-
posals are unfair to presumptive takers, and under the 
Administrative Model that unfairness may rise to the level of a con-
stitutional due process violation. 
A. Quality ef Evidence at Living Probate 
One of the alleged advantages of living probate is the improved 
fact-finding possible when adjudicating the issues of capacity, fraud, 
and undue influence before the testator's death.49 On the contrary, 
living probate sacrifices considerable evidence in order to obtain the 
testator's testimony. Under the Contest Model, presumptive takers 
are deterred from coming forward with meritorious evidence of 
fraud or undue influence. As long as the testator remains free to 
execute a new will, a successful challenge to a will on grounds of 
fraud and undue influence will achieve little; the testator can always 
49. See text at notes 18-20 supra. 
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re-execute the will and force the presumptive takers to find further 
wrongful conduct to invalidate the will again. Even if the original 
will failed to reflect the testator's true intent, once free from fraudu-
lent beliefs or undue influence the testator may execute a new will 
which, consistent with his true intent, disinherits the challengers. 
Professor Langbein responds that perhaps living probate should not 
resolve issues of undue influence at all. But he ultimately concludes 
that "failure to extend the res judicata effect of the living probate 
decree to the undue influence theory would undermine most of the 
reform, since it is so easy (and so common) to tack an undue influ-
ence count on to an unsound mind claim."50 
I seriously doubt that interjecting a guardian ad litem into pro-
ceedings under the Conservatorship Model will improve the quality 
of the evidence presented during probate. To the extent that use of a 
guardian ad litem provides anonymity for persons who offer evi-
dence of testamentary incapacity, fraud, and undue influence, it also 
removes an important disincentive to the raising of unfounded alle-
gations. Imposing the reasonable cost of the guardian ad !item on 
the testator51 enhances this problem. Thus, it is unclear that the 
Conservatorship Model of living probate would lead to a correct de-
cision more often than the Contest Model. 
Finally, to the extent that the Administrative Model ensures con-
fidentiality, it also increases the risk of an erroneous finding that a 
will was executed free from fraud and undue influence, or that the 
testator possessed testamentary capacity. The Adminstrative Model 
subverts the goal of improving fact-finding during living probate be-
cause it precludes interested parties who possess relevant informa-
tion from participating in the adjudicatory process. A legislature 
that enacts the Administrative Model should understand that one of 
the consequences will be to uphold some wills that otherwise would 
be found invalid. 
B. Testamentary Freedom: Assuring That the Testator's Disposition 
Will Be Followed 
A second alleged advantage of living probate is that it will pro-
mote testamentary freedom by assuring the testator that a court will 
carry out his will after his death. Unfortunately, testators will ~ave 
two lingering doubts even after a will is found valid in a living pro-
bate proceeding - doubts that will deter many testators from using 
50. Langbein, supra note 12, at 84-85 (footnote omitted). 
51. See id. at 75. 
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living probate. Testators will remain uncertain as to the validity of 
their wills because of the possibilities of a post-mortem contest based 
upon fraud on the court and fraud or undue influence occurring af-
ter the living probate decree is issued, and also because other states 
may refuse to recognize the living probate decree of the forum state. 
Even after a testator obtains a living probate decree that his will 
is valid, presumptive takers can challenge the court-approved will by 
alleging either fraud on the court during the living probate proceed-
ing or fraud or undue influence after the proceeding that prevented 
the testator from revoking his will. Under the living probate propos-
als, presumptive heirs can set aside a living probate order upon a 
showing of fraud on the court. 52 Fraud on the court would likely 
include the execution of a will that includes bequests to likely con-
testers solely to deter them from litigating if the testator sought to 
obtain a judgment on testamentary capacity that might bear on the 
validity of a new will executed shortly thereafter. If the contestants 
can establish the testator's intent and can show that they abstained 
from litigating because of the bequests to them, the court might nul-
lify the living probate decree.53 Fraud on the court might also in-
clude fraudulent concealment of evidence from the guardian ad 
litem (assuming a Conservatorship or Administrative Model), and 
may even include the negligent failure of the guardian ad litem to 
investigate suspicious conduct. 54 
Presumptive takers can also challenge the court-approved will in 
a post-mortem proceeding by showing that fraud or undue influence 
efter living probate prevented the testator from revoking the will 
and executing a new one. In many cases, wrongful conduct occur-
ring before the execution of the will may continue after execution, 
and a binding living probate decree therefore will not prevent chal-
lenges based on fraud or undue influence. With attacks on the will 
based on fraud and undue influence remaining viable after the testa-
tor's death, living probate only prohibits post-mortem attacks alleg-
ing testamentary incapacity. However, most reported cases that 
contain allegations of testamentary incapacity also include allega-
tions of fraud and undue influence - primarily because deception 
and duress intrude more easily upon the physically or mentally 
weakened testator.55 Thus, for all practical purposes, wills may be 
52. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 117. 
53. Under the Administrative Model, the occurrence of this type of fraud would diminish 
because the incentive of the guardian ad !item to investigate would not hinge so greatly on the 
dispository scheme. 
54. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 118. 
55. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 84-85. 
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no more immune from attack after living probate than before. 
The testator faces a further troubling uncertainty after obtaining 
a living probate decree: the extraterritorial effect of the decree is 
uncertain; it may bind only those persons over whom the forum state 
had personal jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test of Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington56 and its progeny. The extraterrito-
rial effect of a living probate decree concerns, most importantly, full 
faith and credit principles. If the court possessed proper jurisdiction, 
its decree would obtain full faith and credit in every American juris-
diction. Below I examine at some length recent Supreme Court deci-
sions bearing on the limits of a court's jurisdiction, and explore their 
implications for the extraterritorial effect of a living probate decree. 
In order to aid an understanding of these decisions, I begin with a 
brief theoretical discussion of the competing theories of jurisdiction 
necessary to obtain a probate decree. 57 
A probate decree may be viewed as merely an exercise of the 
state's power to control assets located within its boundaries.58 This 
view, generally called the physical power theory,59 implies that each 
state possesses exclusive control over property located within its bor-
ders and that a foreign decree cannot affect that property. 60 It fur-
ther implies that the basis for the local probate proceeding, or the 
jurisdiction of the court, is the property in the estate that is located 
within the state.61 Following this narrow view of jurisdiction for 
probate would lead to inconvenient, inefficient, and expensive pro-
bate administration. With respect to living probate, this traditional 
in rem jurisdiction theory provides no basis for a living probate pro-
56. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
57. For a helpful discussion of these alternative views see Hopkins, 17,e Extraterritorial 
Effect of Probate .Decrees, 53 YALE L.J. 221, 225-54 (1944); Currie, 17re Multiple Personality of 
the .Dead· Executors, Administrators, and the Co,iflict of Laws, 33 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 429 (1966). 
58. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Frederick v. Wilbourne, 198 Ala. 137, 73 
So. 442 (1916); State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Wright, 194 Ark. 652, 109 S.W.2d 123 (1937); In re 
Reynolds' Estate, 217 Cal. 557, 20 P.2d 323 (1933); Bowen v. Johnson, 4 R.I. 112 (1858); Frame 
v. Thormann, 102 Wis. 653, 79 N.W. 39 (1899), qffd, 176 U.S. 350 (1900). 
59. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 
(1877); Hopkins, supra note 57, at 225. See generally, Hazard, A General 17reoryof State-Court 
Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241; Smit, 17re Enduring Utility of In Rem Rule.r: A Lasting 
Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600, 601-06 (1977). 
60. Frederick v.Wilboume, 198 Ala. 197, 73 So. 442 (1916); Pritchard v. Henderson, 18 
Del. (2 Penne.) 553, 47 A. 376 (1900); McCartney v. Osburn, 118 Ill. 403, 9 N.E. 210 (1886); In 
re Neumayer's Estate, 168 Misc. 173, 5 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1938). 
A probate decree in one state is given extraterritorial effect only as to property located in 
that state. Regardless of the decedent's domicile or the fact that panics to the first proceeding 
are also parties to the second proceeding in another state, the first court's decree has no effect 
on property located in that other state. 
61. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 247-49 (1958). 
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ceeding since there is no specific property to distribute. 62 
An alternative view of probate decrees applies the maxim mob ilia 
sequuntur personam and treats property wherever located as if situ-
ated at the decedent's domicile at the time of his death.63 For rea-
sons that will become obvious later in this discussion, I will refer to 
this view as the status theory. Although by its terms and as applied 
in most cases, 64 the maxim is limited to personal property, this re-
striction continues more as a remnant of the physical power theory 
than as a necessary restriction to assure certainty of land titles and 
protection of creditors.65 The theory implies that states abandon ter-
ritorial control over property. Jurisdiction for a probate proceeding 
would hinge not upon the state's power over property but upon the 
state's power to determine the status - intestacy or testacy - of a 
domiciled decedent.66 Under the status approach, an ex parte pro-
ceeding in the testator's domiciliary state determining testacy or in-
testacy would be entitled to full faith and credit in sister states; 
contestants could attack the decree collaterally only to determine 
whether the decedent was actually domiciled in the state issuing the 
probate decree.67 
62. See Fink, supra note 7, at 282-83. Existing living probate statutes, however, are 
designed in a manner that assumes in rem jurisdiction. The Arkansas statute may be used by 
"[a]ny person who executes a will disposing of all or part of an estate located in Arkansas." 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2135 (Cum Supp. 1979). Further, it provides that the expectant heirs 
and the beneficiaries named in the will "shall be deemed possessed of inchoate property 
rights." ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 62-2136 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The North Dakota statute contains a 
similar provision defining the interests of the will beneficiaries and expectant heirs as "incho-
ate property rights." N.D. CENT. CODE§ 30.1-08.1-02 (Supp. 1979). The Ohio statute pro-
vides that the proceeding is available not only to persons domiciled in Ohio but also to persons 
owning real property in Ohio. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.08l(A) (Page Supp. 1979). 
63. See Henderson v. Usher, 118 Fla. 688, 160 So. 9 (1935); Kurtz v. Kurtz's Estate, 169 
Md. 554, 182 A. 456 (1936); Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 330 (1859); Grignon v, 
Shope, 100 Or. 611, 197 P. 317 (1921); Holland v. Jackson, 121 Tex. 1, 37 S.W.2d 726 (1931); 
Hodge v. Taylor, 87 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). 
64. See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Pritchard v. Henderson, 18 Del. (2 
Penne.) 553, 47 A. 376 (1900); Lowe v. Plainfield Trust Co., 216 A.D. 72, 215 N.Y.S. 50 (1926); 
Hopkins, supra note 57, at 249-52. 
65. See Hopkins, supra note 57, at 252-54; Currie, Full Faith and Credi/ lo Foreign Land 
.Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 620, 632-48 (1954). 
66. See Hopkins, supra note 57, at 228-29, 250-51. 
67. A court can ignore a divorce decree upon proof that the state that rendered the decree 
was not at the time the domicile of either spouse. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 
U.S. 226 (1945); Fink v. Fink, 37 Ill. App. 3d 604,346 N.E.2d 415 (1976); Staley v. Staley, 251 
Md. 701, 248 A.2d 655 (1968); Sorrentino v. Mierzwa, 25 N.Y.2d 59, 250 N.E.2d 58, 302 
N.Y.S.2d 565 (1969). 
Applying the status theory to probate cases has been justified by analogy to divorce cases, 
see Hopkins, supra note 57, at 228-29, 250-51, in which domicile of the plaintiff provides an 
adequate jurisdictional basis for a divorce decree, thereby requiring extraterritorial recognition 
of the decree even in the absence of personal service upon the defendant. See Williams v. 
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 368 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 451-52 (3d ed. 1977). The analogy to divorce 
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Before Sht!ffer v. Heitner,68 a landmark jurisdiction decision, the 
Supreme Court did not accept either view of probate jurisdition ex-
clusively. The Court endorsed the physical power theory when de-
termining whether a probate judgment should obtain full faith and 
credit.69 It held that a decree from a state concerning property 
within its boundaries was entitled to full faith and credit every-
where. 70 Similarly, the Court held that as to property not within ter-
ritorial boundaries of a state, the full faith and credit clause had no 
application to that state's probate decree as it operated in rem.71 
Contrary to the physical power theory, however, the Court also re-
quired sister. states to recognize a probate decree to the extent that 
the decree determined personal rights of persons subject to the forum 
state's in personam jurisdiction.72 These latter holdings do not 
cases is not perfect, however. The ex parte divorce proceeding affects only the marital status. I 
use the term "only" intentionally because at the point that a spouse institutes a divorce suit, the 
marriage exists "i.Ji. name only; divorce or no, the state does not force unwilling people to live 
together." Currie, Suitcase .Divorce in the Conflict ef Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and .Borax, 34 
U. CHI. L. REV. 26, 29 (1966). The divorce decree serves the domiciliary state's interest in 
freeing citizens from impediments to remarriage without inflicting economic harm on the non-
resident defendant. It does not affect child custody, child support, or alimony. See Vanderbilt 
v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Estin v. Estin, 334 
U.S. 541 (1948); Currie, supra, at 27-31; Krauskopf, .Divisible .Divorce and Rights to Support, 
Property and Custody, 24 OHIO ST. LJ. 346 (1963). Only a forum with jurisdiction over the 
defendant not based solely on the marriage status can determine these interests. See Vernon, 
State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary IntJuiry into the Impact ef Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 low A 
L. REV. 997, 1016-17 (1978) (in which Vernon addresses the problem of obtaining jurisdiction 
in actions for support and alimony in light of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)). 
A probate decree, on the other hand, is made solely to determine testacy or intestacy - to 
resolve claims of economic interest. A finding of testacy or intestacy operates only to deter-
mine, as between competing claimants, who will obtain the property found in the decedent's 
estate. Nevertheless, the divorce analogy remains persuasive. Although the Supreme Court 
has held that an ex parte divorce proceeding cannot determine a wife's right to child custody, 
child support, or alimony, it has also held, in Simons v. Miami Beach First Natl. Bank, 381 
U.S. 81 (1965), that the ex parte divorce proceeding may operate to terminate her right to 
inherit dower as the spouse of the decedent. 381 U.S. at 85. See Currie, supra, at 27-44, for an 
excellent discussion of this case. The Simons case may make the analogy to divorce cases more 
appropriate than it would otherwise appear. 
Interestingly, the status theory harmonizes with the basic rationale for the Administrative 
Model; the issue of testacy or intestacy concerns primarily the decedent and the state. See 
Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 102-03. But adoption of the status theory of jurisdic-
tion for probate proceedings, does not eliminate the requirement of notice to interested parties. 
Whether presumptive takers own constitutionally protected property interests and must be 
given notice and an opportunity to appear at a probate proceeding still requires resolution. 
See text at notes 111-63 infra. 
68. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
69. See VanDusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 
(1958); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942); Iowa v. Slimmer, f48 U.S. 115 
(1918); Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214 
(1900); Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256 (1883). Cf. Arndt v. Griggs, 1_34 U.S. 315 (1890) (action 
to recover possession of land and quiet title). 
10. See Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608 (1883) (dictum). 
11. See Thorman v. Frame, 176 U.S. 350 (1900). 
72. See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942) (dictum); Robertson v. Pickrell, 
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necesarily conflict with the physical power theory; they may only 
have expanded it to include a state's power over persons as well as 
over property located within the state's boundaries.73 
The Court's decision in Hanson v . .Denck!a14 most clearly demon-
strated its abandonment of the status theory. In Hanson, the Court 
denied Florida jurisdiction to decide, as against a Delaware trustee, 
whether a Florida decedent had validly exercised an inter vivos 
power of appointment over a trust corpus located in Delaware. In 
upholding Florida jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Florida had 
relied on an earlier Florida Supreme Court decision in Henderson v. 
Usher15 that had essentially adopted the status theory:76 
Since the interpretation of the will is the primary question with which 
we are confronted, we are impelled to hold that the res is at least con-
structively in this state and that the Florida courts are empowered to 
advise the trustees how to proceed under it and what rights those af-
fected have in it. For the immediate purpose of this suit the will is the 
res and when that is voluntarily brought into the courts in Florida to be 
construed the trust created by it is to all intents and purposes with it.77 
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in Hanson, rejected this 
argument: 
The settlor-decedent's Florida domicile is . . . unavailing as a basis for 
jurisdiction over the trust assets. For the purpose of jurisdiction in rem 
109 U.S. 608 (1883) (dictum). Cf. Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108, 121 (1869) (dic-
tum) (in a dispute involving the validity of a divorce decree rendered in Indiana, the Court 
stated that so far as the decree related to real property located in Washington, D.C., it could 
have no extraterritorial effect; but, if valid, it bound those who were parties in the case, and 
could have been enforced in the situs by the proper proceeding conducted there); Watts v. 
Waddle, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 389,396 (1832) (court held that decree concerning title to land bound 
persons over whom the court possessed jurisdiction in personam although the land in question 
was located in another state); Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 157-60 (1810) (in dis-
pute over jurisdiction of a Kentucky court, arising out of suit brought to obtain conveyance of 
land located in Ohio, Court stated that jurisdiction of chancery court is sustainable in cases of 
fraud, trust, or contract wherever the defendant is found, although land outside of court's 
jurisdiction may be affected by the decree); R. LEFLAR, supra note 67, at§§ 82, 165,201. Bui 
cf. Courtney v. Henry, 114 Ill. App. 635 (1904) (Illinois court could disregard two previous 
Ohio cases concerning title to land in Illinois because full faith and credit principles do not 
apply to decisions that affect interests in real estate). 
The extraterritorial effect of a decree from Forum 1 affecting land in Forum 2 may be 
severely limited if the decree only binds persons who were made parties to the first litigation. 
In many instances subsequent litigation involves third persons who were not parties to the first 
judgment. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900). 
13. See Hazard, supra note 59, at 242-45. But see Smit, supra note 59, at 601-06 (argues 
that courts have replaced the physical power test with the reasonableness test). After Sltqffer 
and its progeny, the viability of the physical power theory is left in doubt. Requiring that the 
defendant have minimum contacts with the forum despite the situs of property within the 
forum, undercuts the physical power theory. See notes 79-103 infra and accompanying text. 
74. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
75. 118 Fla. 688, 160 So. 9 (1935). 
16. See 100 S.2d 378, 385 (Fla. 1956). 
77. 118 Fla. at 692, 160 So. at 10. 
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the maxim that personalty has its situs at the domicile of its owner is a 
function of limited utility . . . . The maxim is no less suspect when 
the domicile is that of a decedent. In analogous cases, this Court has 
rejected the suggestion that the probate decree of the State where dece-
dent was domiciled has an in rem effect on personalty outside the fo-
rum State that could render it conclusive on the interests of 
nonresidents over whom there was no personal jurisdiction.78 
In Shaffer v. Heitner,19 decided in 1977, the Court apparently re-
jected application of the physical power theory to property. Shaffer 
involved a challenge to Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction to decide 
a shareholder derivative suit based on a nonresident defendant's 
ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation. The Court recog-
nized, contrary to Pennoyer v. Nef.f,80 ''that an adverse judgment in 
rem directly affects the property owner by divesting him of his rights 
in the property before the court."81 This recognition led the Court to 
hold "that in order to justify an exercise of jursidiction in rem, the 
basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdic-
tion over the interests of persons in a thing'. The standard for deter-
mining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of 
persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum 
contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe."82 The Court 
did not go so far as to say that the presence of property in the state 
was irrelevant: 
This argument, of course, does not ignore the fact that the presence of 
property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by provid-
ing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. 
For example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the 
underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it 
would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to 
have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendants' claim to property lo-
cated in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit 
from the State's protection of his interest.83 
The Court thereby held that the presence of property within the 
forum could be evidence of the nonresident defendant's expectation 
of benefit from the state's protection and could thereby constitute the 
critical nexus between the forum and the nonresident needed to sat-
78. 357 U.S. 235, 249 (1958) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
79. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
80. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
81. 433 U.S. at 206. Although Shaffer could be read narrowly as serving only to reverse 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction of the Harris v. Balk type, later Supreme Court cases make it•clear 
that it was not intended to be read restrictively. See Hay, The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and 
Choice-of-Law in U.S. Co,!flicts Law, 28 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 161, 166-70 (1979). 
82. 433 U.S. at 207 (footnote omitted). 
83. 433 U.S. at 207-08 (footnotes omitted). 
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isfy the m1mmum contacts test. The court stated that the nexus 
would exist, for example, where a mortgagee sues a nonresident-
mortgagor-landowner to foreclose a mortgage on land located in the 
forum, or where a plaintiff sues a nonresident landowner alleging 
that the condition of the property located in the forum caused per-
sonal injury to the plaintiff.84 
Although a less clear case, Sht!lfer may not invalidate attempts to 
require nonresident claimants, such as intestate succession takers, to 
litigate the validity of a will in a jurisdiction where property found in 
the estate is located. The Sha.ffer Court indicated that a strong state 
interest combined with the location in the state of property that is the 
source of the underlying controversy could support jurisdiction: 
The State's strong interests in assuring the marketability of property 
within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution 
of disputes about the possession of that property would also support 
jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and wit-
nesses will be found in the State. 85 
This dictum may prove crucial in determining the limits of a 
state's jurisdiction in probate cases, because often no nexus will exist 
between the state and the nonresident-estate claimant. To say that a 
will contestant enjoyed "the benefits from the State's protection of 
his interest" ignores the ''voluntariness" aspect of the minimum con-
tacts test. As stated in Hanson, "it is essential in each case that there 
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [him]self of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . ."86 
That the decedent happened to leave property in the forum state in 
which the defendant claims an interest says nothing about the de-
fendant's voluntary contact with the forum.87 
If, regardless of the presence of property in the forum, the Shaf-
fer decision requires a forum-defendant nexus88 under the standards 
84. See 433 U.S. at 208. 
85. 433 U.S. at 208 (footnotes omitted). 
86. 351 U.S. at 253. 
87. Criticisms of Hanson's distinction of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 
220 (1957), that there were not equivalent minimum contacts between the Delaware trustee 
and the decedent, are inapplicable here. See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of1Slale Courts From Pennoyer lo Denckla: •A 
Review,125 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 621-22 (1958). Beneficiaries or intestate takers who are claim-
ing in probate are distinguishable from the nonresident defendant in McGee. In McGee the 
nonresident defendant solicited a reinsurance agreement with a resident of California, the offer 
was accepted by the California resident in California, and the insurance premiums were 
mailed from California until the insured's death. The Supreme Court upheld personal juris-
diction over the nonresident insurance company because the suit was based on a contract that 
had substantial connection with California. Bui see Fink, supra note 7, at 282, 282 n.40. 
88. The importance of the "purposeful act" was reiterated in Shqjfer, see 433 U.S. at 216, 
and in Supreme Court cases decided after Shqjfer. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
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set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington89 for assertion of 
jurisdiction in a probate case, probate administration will fall into 
substantial disarray. The emphasis on the forum-defendant nexus is 
not new but previously had been the basis for the decision in Han-
son, in which the Court held that Florida's interest in winding up the 
estate of a decedent domiciled in Florida was insufficient to override 
the burden on a nonresident defendant to litigate there.90 The hold-
ing in Hanson was not particularly disruptive of probate administra-
tion because property located in the state continued to be a valid 
basis for assertion of jurisdiction. Now, if under Shajfer, the pres-
ence of property in the state is also not alone sufficient for jurisdic-
tion, an executor or administrator might have to probate a will in 
each state in which potential claimants reside. 
When the Supreme Court realizes that present rules of jurisdic-
tion may preclude any one forum from adjudicating everyone's in-
terest in probate, it may not insist on the forum-litigation-defendant 
nexus for living probate decrees.91 Instead, the Court may refer to . 
its holding in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,92 in which it 
held that New York had jurisdiction to settle a New York trustee's 
accounts as against nonresident beneficiaries, based not in rem93 or in 
personam,94 but rather by necessity:95 · 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980); Kulko v. 
California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). However, none of these cases involved a 
dispute centering upon the ownership of property in the state attempting to assert jurisdiction. 
89. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). All assertions of jurisdiction must be evaluated according to this 
minimum contacts standard. This reexamination was not attempted in Shqffer. "It would not 
be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the rationales of Pennoyer and 
Harris to determine whether jurisdiction might have been sustained under the standard we 
adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are 
overruled." 413 U.S. at 212 n.39. 
90. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 259-60 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); notes 74-78 
supra and accompanying text 
91. The Court has been criticized for not having given adequate consideration in Hanson 
to the problem of multiplicity of litigation. See Smit; supra note 59, at 609 n.41. 
92. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 
(1957), appeal dismissed sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 
(1958). 
93. The trustee's account did not affect title to the property and the trustee's obligation to 
beneficiaries was not a sufficient res. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 
(1916). In .Dunlevy the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction to terminate 
a nonresident's claim to the proceeds to a life insurance policy owed by the interpleading 
plaintiff insurance company. But see Smit, supra note 59, at 624-25. Smit argues that the 
asserted claim against the insurance company should itself be a sufficient res for jurisdictional 
purposes. See also Hazard, supra note 59, at 278-81. Of course, after Shqffer, even if a suffi-
cient res were found in the .Dunlevy case, minimum contacts with the forum by the nonresident 
defendant would be required. 
94. This was true because the court lacked the requisite jurisdiction over both creditor and 
debtor needed to determine conclusively whether one was liable to the other. See New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). But see Currie, supra note 57, at 435 n.34. 
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It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition of its 
chosen procedure, the interest of each state in providing means to close 
trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the 
supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to estab-
lish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all 
claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full 
opportunity to appear and be heard.96 
Like Mullane, the state's interest in avoiding multiple litigation and 
in permitting effective recourse to the benefits of its laws are also 
present for probate administration. 
Assuming that after Shaffer the Court will carve out an exception 
for probate and other similar multiple litigation situations, many 
questions remain as to the appropriate forum for conducting pro-
bate. The Court is likely to adopt one of the following two ap-
proaches for determining jurisdiction. Under the first approach, 
jurisdiction for probate matters would be based on the domicile of 
the decedent. If the Court were to adopt this approach, it would 
have to overrule Hanson. By abandoning the traditional legal fiction 
that naming a res as a party defendant is sufficient to obtain jurisdic-
tion and by recognizing that persons' rights in property are at stake, 
the Court after Shaffer is free to identify the appropriate forum in 
which to conduct probate administration irrespective of the situs of 
the property found in the decedent's estate. In most cases, probate 
administration, which includes discovery and collection of assets, de-
termination and payment of taxes, debts, funeral and administrative 
expenses, determination and distribution to persons entitled to re-
ceive the property under the will or by the intestate succession stat-
ute, can most easily be conducted at the domicile of the decedent.97 
This forum is no less. convenient for all the estate claimants than any 
other forum, and it is as likely as any other forum to be the place 
where most of the claimants reside, the place where most of the 
property is located, and the place where witnesses and records are 
easily available. Also, the claimants to the estate have usually not 
Currie suggests that Dunlevy was ·an erroneous decision. Given the need to avoid multiple 
payment, Currie argues that jurisdiction is proper in a state in which one claimant could have 
been sued to determine liability if there had been no competing claims. 
95. See Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, l 00 U. PA. L. 
REv. 305 (1951). See also Hazard, supra note 59, at 283-84. Other scholars have written in 
support of such an approach. See Smit, The Importance of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or 
Minimal?, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 519, 523 (1979). 
96. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
91. See Hopkins, supra note 57, at 249-54, 263-70; Currie, supra note 57, at 429-38. 
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entered into any transactions with respect to property found in the 
estate, but, instead, their interest arises out of their personal relation-
ship with the decedent. 98 
The essential implication of binding all claimants, regardless of 
minimum contacts with the forum, to an adjudication of probate in 
the decedent's domicile is that the status theory would replace the 
physical power theory in probate.99 The decree would have to be 
given full faith and credit in any other state. To infer this result 
from the Shaffer decision is troubling because that case emphasized 
the territorial limitations on state power and checked the trend to-
ward nationwide service of process begun by International Shoe. 
Yet, by requiring a nexus between the forum, the litigation, and the 
defendant, the Court diminished the state's power to control prop-
erty found within its borders. Looking at the Shaffer decision from 
this viewpoint, complete probate in tlie decedent's domicile is not a 
surprising result. 
If the Court adopts the domicile-of-the-testator-approach, living 
probate decrees issued from any of the living probate models would 
be afforded full faith and credit as long as the forum was the domi-
cile of the decedent at death. 100 The living probate decree might also 
be accorded full faith and credit if the forum is the domicile of the 
decedent at the time of the proceeding. In either case, if the court 
were to adopt the domicile-of-the-testator approach, the attractive-
ness and usefulness of all the living probate models would increase. 
A second approach available to the Court for determining a 
proper forum for probate is to base jurisdiction upon the situs of the 
property. This approach can be supported by the dictum in Shaffer 
suggesting that a strong state interest combined with property lo-
98. One exception to this latter generalization encompasses secured creditors of the dece-
dent. But when tangible or intangible personal property is at issue, even secured creditors 
cannot claim substantial unfairness if the probate forum is not the situs of the property. They 
had no reasonable expectation that the property would reinain in the same forum where secur-
ity was perfected. As for real property, however, requiring secured creditors to litigate their 
claims in a forum other than the situs of the property may raise problems of fairness. To 
resolve this difficult issue, a court must balance the interest of the estate in avoiding multiple 
litigation, the interest of the state in providing one forum to wind up the estate, and the interest 
of the creditor in not having to perfect his claim in a foreign state. See Smit, supra note 59, at 
608-13. 
99. See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text. 
100. Under the Administrative Model, a question still remains as to whether notice and an 
opportunity to appear are constitutionally required. Assuming that these protective safeguards 
are not necessary, the living probate decree issued under the Administrative Model must be 
given extraterritorial effect under the domicile-of-the-testator approach. But see note 62 supra 
(describing the jurisdictional rules of existing living probate statutes). 
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cated in the state might be sufficient to support jurisdiction.101 The 
extraterritorial effect of the decree would be limited to property lo-
cated in the forum. If the Court were to adopt this approach and bar 
probate proceedings at the testator's domicile, then the extraterrito-
rial effect of the living probate models would be severely restricted. 
Jurisdiction based on situs of the property would be unavailable be-
cause no particular property is at issue in living probate. 102 The 
property found in the testator's estate at the time of his death could 
totally differ from the property owned at the time of the living .pro-
bate proceeding. A state would thus have no strong interest in as-
serting jurisdiction merely because the testator owned property in 
the state at the time of the proceeding. Without such an interest pre-
sumably a state could only assert jurisdiction over a nonresident 
claimant under the minimum contacts standard, and the extraterrito-
rial effect of the living probate decree would be so limited.103 
101. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. 
102. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. 
103. Questions of in personam jurisdiction as it relates to the extraterritorial effect of the ex 
parte proceeding become very complicated under the Administrative Model. If the constitu-
tionality of the Adminstrative Model were based on the adequacy of its procedures, see notes 
158-63 infra and accompanying text, the ability to obtain personal jurisdiction arguably still 
might be important even though the parties would not have the right to notice or the opportu-
nity to appear. The requirement would continue to impose important territorial limits on the 
power of a state. Such a rule would also be consistent with existing case law. If the Adminis-
trative Model were found to be constitutional on the theory that the state has created no pro-
tectible property interest, see notes 111-57 infra and accompanying text, then personal 
jurisdiction seems unnecessary. Whether this decree will be given effect in another state de-
pends not upon full faith and credit of judgment principles but instead upon choice-of-law 
rules and upon whether the law of another state must be given full faith and credit in the 
forum. The same result would follow if the Administrative Model were found to be constitu-
tional on the theory that it involves not a judgment, but rather a law prescribing will execution 
formalities in the state that waives the substantive formalities of mental capacity and absence 
of fraud or undue influence upon compliance with these designated procedural formalities. 
See text at notes 157-58 infra. In such a case, the extraterritorial effect of the ex parte proceed• 
ing again will depend upon choice-of-law rules and upon whether the law of the state must be 
given full faith and credit in the forum. 
The general common-law choice-of-law rule is that the law of the situs of the testator's land 
(including that jurisdiction's relevant choice-of-law rules) determines the validity of bequests 
of real property, R. LEFLAR, supra note 67, at 401; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS§ 239 (1971), and that the law of the testator's domicile at death determines the validity 
of bequests of personal property. R. LEFLAR, supra note 67, at 401; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 263 (1971). To ensure that a will would be valid regardless of where 
the testator owns land or is domiciled at the time of his death, many states have enacted 
statutes specifying additional choice-of-law rules to determine the validity of wills of real and 
of personal property. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 ½, § 7-1 (1977); N.Y. EsT., POWERS & 
TRUST LAW § 3-5.l(c) (McKinney 1967); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 2-506. These statutes 
generally declare that a will is valid if executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed 
by the forum state, by the state where it was executed, or by the state where the testator was 
domiciled at the time of its execution. These statutes are not uniform. Some may provide that 
a written will is valid if executed in compliance with the law of the place where the testator is 
domiciled at the time of death. See, e.g., N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUST LAW§ 3-5.l{c) (Mc-
Kinney 1967); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 2-506. Still other statutes may provide that the will 
is valid if admitted to probate in another state. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 ½, § 7-1 
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In summary, the extraterritorial effect of the living probate de-
cree is inextricably intertwined with the recent landmark case of 
Shaffer v. Heitner, which leaves the basis for jurisdiction of a pro-
bate proceeding in doubt. Relying on Mullane, I suggest that the 
Court is likely to permit a probate court to assert jurisdiction over a 
nonresident claimant despite the claimant's lack of minimum con-
tacts with the forum. Not to recognize jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent claimant in this situation would preclude one· forum from 
adjudicating everyone's interest in probate. As in Mullane, the 
Court will be reluctant not to make an exception to the general juris-
dictional rules. The proper forum for this ''jurisdiction by necessity" 
may be either the decedent's domicile or the situs of property found 
in the decedent's estate. If domicile is accepted as a proper forum 
and if jurisdiction by necessity is carved out as an exception to the 
forum-litigation-defendant nexus insisted upon in Sha_ffer, the living 
probate decree will have the binding effect its proponents expected. 
If, however, the Court refuses to recognize an exception to the fo-
rum-litigation-defendant nexus, or if the Court limits jurisdiction by 
necessity to the situs of the property, then the living probate decrees 
(1977). However, these statutes have been interpreted to apply only to formal requirements for 
a valid execution; invalidity due to substantive requirements like mental incapacity, fraud, or 
undue influence remains subject to the common-law rules described above. See Crossett Lum-
ber Co. v. Files, 104 Ark. 600, 149 S.W. 908 (1912); Guidry v. Hardy, 254 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 
1971); Schalk v. Dickinson, 232 N.W.2d 140 (S.D. 1975). 
Although narrow application of these statutes is usually insignificant because of the sub-
stantial similarity of will validity standards among the various states, it may substantially re-
duce the extraterritorial effect of nonbinding decrees produced under the Administrative 
Model unless the forum state has adopted a similar law. Absent adoption of the Administra-
tive Model or of laws reflecting a similar policy not to recognize expectancies as protectible 
property interests (or not to require testamentary capacity or absence of fraud and undue influ-
ence for the execution of a valid will), another state is not likely to recognize the decree from 
the ex parte proceeding. Unless the contacts with the state are so slight and casual that to 
apply the forum's state law would be inconsistent with due process, the forum is free to apply 
its own law in furtherance of its own view of public policy. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 
377 U.S. 179 (1969); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 306 U.S. 493 
(1939); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Hague v. 
Allstate Ins. Co.,_ Minn._, 289 N.W.2d 43 (1979) cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980). For 
a proposal that a state only be allowed to apply its law to a case where it has the minimum 
contacts required by International Shoe for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant, see Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872 
(1980). · 
When presented, for example, with a factual situation in which the decedent domiciled in 
Illinois at his death obtained an ex parte determination in Illinois that a will bequeathing all 
his property to a religious cult is valid, a court in another state, which is the situs of some of 
decedent's personal property and domicile of decedent's children, will be very reluctant to 
refuse the children an opportunity to litigate the issues of testamentary capacity, fraud, or 
undue influence. In the absence of a specific choice-of-law statute to the contrary, a court in 
the second state is likely to find either that eliminating mental capacity, absence of fraud, and 
undue influence as requirements for the execution of a valid will is contrary to the state's 
public policy, or that an expectancy interest as defined in the state is property deserving of due 
process protection. In either case, the second state has the power not to apply Illinois law. 
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will only bind those persons who purposefully avail themselves of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. For the 
Administrative Model, the extraterritorial effect is even more uncer-
tain unless the Court is willing to recognize jurisdiction of courts in 
the state of domicile of the decedent. 
Because the extraterritorial effect of a living probate decree re-
mains uncertain, a testator cannot be sure that his will is safe from 
attack as long as he has presumptive heirs, property, or domicile 
outside the forum state. This uncertainty, combined with the threat 
of post-mortem challenges based on claims of fraud on the court and 
fraud or undue influence subsequent to the living probate decree, 
significantly reduces the assurance of validity that a living probate 
decree can offer a testator. 
C. Excessive Costs to Testators 
A third failing of living probate is the high price it exacts from 
testators in return for an ephemeral assurance that their wills are 
secure from challenge. That price includes physical and mental ex-
amination, participation in the court proceeding, the cost of an attor-
ney and of a guardian ad litem ( depending upon the proposal 
adopted), and the risk of family disharmony. These costs will inevi-
tably deter many testators from using the proceeding regardless of 
the benefits obtained. 
After balancing the benefits of living probate against these costs, 
a testator will very likely tum to alternative methods of achieving 
certainty of testamentary disposition - most notably to the revoca-
ble trust. 104 Although expectant heirs may challenge a revocable 
trust for mental incompetency, 105 fraud, or undue influence, 106 po-
tential challengers are much less likely to know that that trust exists 
than that a will exists. The settlor of the trust need not publicly dis-
close its existence. Moreover, when a trust exists for a significant 
period, the trustee's testimony concerning the settlor's capacity to 
104. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 95; Langbein, supra note 12, at 67. 
105. Most states have statutes that incapacitate a property owner under the protection of a 
guardian or conservator from making inter vivos gifts, but permit him to execute a will. The 
legal standard for donative capacity may therefore be more stringent than the legal standard 
for testamentary capacity. If the property owner is not under the care of a guardian or conser-
vator, however, the courts apply the same legal standard for donative capacity as they do for 
testamentary capacity. See, e.g., Lowe v. Hart, 93 Ark. 548, 125 S.W. 1030 (1910); Thome v. 
Consand, 160 Ind. 566, 67 N.E. 257 (1903); Stouffer v. Wolfkill, 114 Md. 603, 80 A. 300 (1911); 
Flynn v. Union Natl. Bank of Springfield, 378 S.W.2d I (Mo. App. 1964); Patterson v. 
Halterman, 161 Mont. 278, ~OS P.2d 905 (1973); Riggs v. American Tract Socy., 95 N.Y. 503 
(1884); Grignon v. Shope, 100 Or. 611, 197 P. 317 (1921). 
106. See 4 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 333-333.3 (3d ed. 1967). 
June 1980] The Case Against Living Probate 1095 
conduct business with the trustee reduces the chance of successful 
challenge. Through the revocable trust, the settlor can help to pro-
tect against disruption of his dispository scheme107 without relin-
quishing significant control of the property before death. Given this 
attractive alternative, few people are likely to use living probate. 
D. Uefairness to Presumptive Takers 
Quite apart from the usefulness or attractiveness of living pro-
bate to the testator, the three living probate proposals raise troubling 
policy questions. To. prevent unwarranted strike suits and to pre-
serve the right to testamentary freedom, the living probate schemes 
sacrifice fair adjudicatory procedures for the presumptive takers. 
The Contest Model requires presumptive takers to choose between 
unattractive alternatives: they can either remain silent, allowing the 
will to be validated and to extinguish their expectancies, or they can 
challenge the will, disrupting family harmony and incurring litiga-
tion costs earlier than otherwise necessary to retain the possibility of 
inheriting an indeterminate amount of property. Even if their chal-
lenge succeeds, they risk later disinheritance by the testator either 
through his donative transfers or through his execution of a subse-
quent will that requires the presumptive takers to decide again 
whether to litigate.108 
These alternatives are improved under the Conservatorship 
Model. The use of a guardian ad litem, however, will do little to 
shield presumptive takers since the sources of the guardian's infor-
mation will often be obvious to the testator. Of course, the presump-
tive taker's ability to litigate fraud and undue influence in post-
mortem proceedings by showing that wrongful conduct prevented 
revocation of the court-approved will reduces the unfairness of the 
Contest and Conservatorship Models. That breach of living pro-
bate's promise of certainty against future attack, however, hardly de-
serves recognition as an attribute of the proposals. 
Of all the proposals, the Administrative Model places the pre-
sumptive takers in the worst possible position; they receive no notice 
of the proceeding and depend completely upon the investigation of a 
disinterested guardian ad litem. Without an economically interested 
107. But see Knowles v. Binford, 268 Md. 2,298 A.2d 862 (1973). 
108. A challenge based on testamentary incapacity during living probate is less of an im-
position on the presumptive takers because, at the least, the finding of incapacity can be intro-
duced in a subsequent will contest (ante-mortem or post-mortem). This problem is obviously 
worse if the presumptive takers must pay for their own litigation costs as under the presently 
enacted statutes in Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio. 
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party litigating the issues, the likelihood of erroneous determinations 
substantially increases. For two important reasons, providing confi-
dentiality and avoiding risk of family disharmony, costs of notice, 
and risk of unfounded allegations does not justify a procedure that 
fails to provide presumptive takers notice or an opportunity to ap-
pear during the living probate process. First, as a matter of policy, 
notice and a hearing for presumptive takers seem desirable. Second, 
denying notice and a hearing may violate the due process clause of 
the Constitution. 
Alexander and Pearson want to eliminate notice and a hearing 
for presumptive takers because they fear that the risks of family dis-
harmony and breached confidentiality that accompany these safe-
guards will deter testators from using living probate. But the risk of 
family disharmony or breached confidentiality deters use of the liv-
ing probate procedure in exactly those cases where the state should 
be most concerned about providing notice to, and a full hearing for, 
disappointed heirs. 
A testator who disinherits a distant cousin in favor of a religious 
cult is not as likely to be concerned about family harmony and confi-
dentiality as is a testator who disinherits his nuclear family in favor 
of the same organization. In the latter case, the testator might be 
quite attracted by the secrecy of the Administrative Model. But that 
attraction cannot justify a less accurate procedure for determining 
will validity, particularly when the primary purpose of requiring 
mental capacity is to protect the testator's family and society from 
uninformed dispositions that leave family members as wards of the 
state.109 The features of the Administrative Model that may be at-
tractive to testators conflict with this public policy. 110 
Notice and a hearing for presumptive takers may be more than a 
wise policy - they may be a constitutional right. Alexander and 
Pearson argue that the lack of notice and hearing under the Admin-
istrative Model is constitutional because presumptive takers do not 
own constitutionally protected property interests.111 While conced-
ing that the differences between ante-mortem and post-mortem pro-
bate "provide an insignificant basis for constitutional distinction,"112 
109. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 232-33; Note, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell; A 
Psychiatric Reevaluation, supra note 25, at 1122-24. See generally Cavers, supra note 4, 
I 10. Alexander and Pearson suggest that their proposal could be modified either to pro-
vide notice and an opportunity to appear to nuclear family members, or to exempt them from 
the binding decree, but they ultimately reject these modifications as inconsistent with the 
nonadversarial ex parte proceeding. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 115-16. 
111. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 98-99. 
112. Id. at 111. 
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Alexander and Pearson argue first that the landmark Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 113 decision does not offer grounds 
to extend due process protection to presumptive takers either before 
or efter the testator's death. In Mullane, the court struck down a 
New York statute that gave pooled trust beneficiaries notice of a ju-
dicial settlement of accounts by publication alone. The Court held 
that publication alone was a constitutionally inadequate method of 
notice "to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence," 
but that it was an adequate form of notice to beneficiaries ''whose 
interests are either conjectural or future" and to those ''whose inter-
ests or addresses are unknown to the trustee." 114 
Alexander and Pearson correctly observe that Mullane does not 
necessarily require that contingent future interests (which they ac-
knowledge to be traditional property rights) receive due process pro-
tections. Publication notice had been provided to these interests 
under the New York statute, and the constitutional question was 
therefore never presented to the Court.115 Nevertheless, the Court 
did reach the question of the adequacy of the publication notice for 
persons owning remote contingent interests, and it held such notice 
sufficient. 116 The Court balanced the difficulty in discovering the ad-
dresses of remote trust beneficiaries against their interests and con-
cluded that requiring notice by mail to these persons would impose 
an excessive burden on the trustee. 117 Since the trustee already knew 
the place of residence of all known present beneficiaries, publication 
notice was inadequate for those persons.118 This balancing implies 
that the remote beneficiaries were entitled to at least some protec-
tion, and that they would have had a constitutional right to appear in 
the proceedings had they seen the publication notice.119 
Just as Mullane implies that holders of contingent remainders are 
entitled to some due process protection, the similarities between the 
113. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). For examples of state court cases holding Mullane inapplicable 
to probate proceedings, see Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 101 n.39. 
114. 339 U.S. at 318. 
115. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 99-100 n.36. 
116. 339 U.S. at 317-18. 
117. The court stated that the "practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on 
frequent investigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries . . . would impose a 
severe burden on the plan, and would likely dissipate its advantages." 339 U.S. at 317-18. 
118. 339 U.S. at 318. 
119. That this reading of Mullane is more fair is further demonstrated by the Court's com-
parison of the problem of discovering the beneficiaries who owned remote interests with those 
cases in which persons had been missing for many years and the state provided for the admin-
istration of their property. See 339 U.S. at 317 (citing Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. l (1911); 
Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1904)). 
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expectancies of presumptive takers and contingent remainders sug-
gest that expectancies should be protected as well. The failure of the 
Administrative Model to provide any notice of a probate procedure 
that can extinguish these expectancies may therefore violate the 
Constitution. 
Alexander and Pearson argue against extension of Mullane to ex-
pectancies by reference to traditional property law classifications120 
and to a state's power to define the rights of inheritance. First, they 
observe that the trust beneficiaries in Mullane owned estates recog-
nized at common law as property, whereas presumptive takers have 
neither a traditionally enforceable interest in the testator's property nor 
a fiduciary relationship with the property's custodian. To illustrate the 
distinction, consider inter vivos transfers of property by the testator. 
Such transfers generally are valid despite their adverse effect on expec-
tant heirs and legatees. Those individuals whose hopes are extin-
guished by such transfers have no rights to compensation.121 
Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank, 122 in which the 
Supreme Court held that a state ex parte divorce proceeding could 
not only bind the nonresident s_pouse on the issue of marital status, 
but could also terminate the spouse's dower rights, supports this dis-
tinction. Unfortunately, the Simons Court did not discuss thor-
oughly the reasons why the financial loss of dower was not a 
deprivation of property.123 The dower interest in a decedent's estate 
is, if anything, more substantial than the rights of other presumptive 
takers being litigated in a living probate proceeding. And the ex 
parte divorce proceeding and its effect on dower is functionally simi-
lar to the living probate proceeding of the Administrative Model and 
its effect on other expectancy interests. Dower depends upon a find-
ing of marriage or nonmarriage just as the expectancy interests de-
pend upon a finding of testacy or intestacy. Also, just as the plaintiff 
in a divorce proceeding must prove grounds for divorce, the finding 
of testacy or intestacy depends upon factual inquiry into testamen-
tary incapacity, fraud, or undue influence. Nevertheless, Simons 
does not foreclose further inquiry. Simons has been severely criti-
cized in the literature.124 More importantly, the ex parte divorce 
proceeding in Simons is distinguishable from the living probate pro-
120. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 101-02. 
121. Id. at 101-02 (footnotes omitted). 
122. 381 U.S. 81 (1965). 
123. In a brief paragraph the court merely noted the inchoateness of Ms. Simons's claim to 
dower, which might suggest that at the time of the ex parte divorce proceeding, the right to 
dower was not property within the meaning of the due process clause. See 381 U.S. at 85 & 
n.6. 
124. See Currie, supra note 67, at 33-38. 
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ceeding under the Administrative Model in that the plaintiff in 
Simons was at least provided notice and an opportunity to appear. 
Presented with a case where these protections, rather than personal 
jurisdiction, were absent, 125 the Court might not hold that the dower 
interest can be terminated. 
Although the Alexander and Pearson distinction between an ex-
pectancy interest and a traditionally recognized estate in property 
may appeal to a property lawyer, constitutionally protected property 
interests are identified not by a state's formalistic labelling but in-
stead by their functional alikeness126 to property interests recognized 
as protected under the due process clause by the Supreme Court. 
The expectancies at issue in living probate may be functionally iden-
tical to the contingent interests considered in Mullane. 
A comparison between the conditions and events that can pre-
vent an expectancy and an equitable contingent remainder from 
vesting uncovers striking similarities. Consider the following exam-
ple: 
0 declares a trust in Blackacre, naming himself as trustee and retain-
ing a power to revoke the trust at any time. Under the trust, 0 retains 
an income interest in Blackacre until his death, whereupon Blackacre 
is to be transferred in tenancy in common to those of O's children who 
are alive at his death. At the time the trust is created, C is O's only 
child, and O is unmarried. 
0 owns a reversionary interest in Blackacre that will become posses-
sory upon his death without children surviving. The reversionary 
interest will pass at his death either by intestate succession or by will 
unless O, through an inter vivos conveyance, transfers the reversion-
ary interest. C owns an equitable contingent remainder in Blackacre 
and, as O's sole expectant heir, an expectancy interest in O's rever-
sionary interest in Blackacre. Cs equitable contingent remainder is 
a traditionally recognized property interest but the expectancy inter-
est is not. 
The equitable contingent remainder can be totally defeated if: 
( 1) C predeceases O; (2) 0 revokes the trust and transfers the re-
mainder interest in Blackacre to another person during his life; or (3) 
125. See Vernon, supra note 67, at 1016-17. Vernon questions how the nonresident spouse 
can obtain jurisdiction in actions to obtain alimony and support under Sht!ffer. 
126. See Van Alstyne,· Cracks in "The New Property'~· Adjudicative Due Process in the Ad-
ministrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445,454 (1977); Currie, supra note 67, at 34-37. q: 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (lower court decision holding unconstitutional a 
statute that exempted certain conscientious objectors from combatant training and service in 
the military reversed based on determination that the statute exempted individuals whose con-
scientious scruples against such services were parallel to those of other persons exempted by 
the Act except that they were not rooted in the supposed dictates of a "Supreme Being," as the 
Act seemed to require). 
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0 revokes the trust, retains Blackacre in fee simple absolute until his 
death, and devises it to another person by will or allows it to pass by 
intestate succession to his heirs. C's equitable contingent remainder 
can be partially defeated if O has another child who also survives 0 
or if O modifies the trust reducing the share of the remainder going 
to his children. In any case, C would not have standing to object to 
any actions O took with respect to Blackacre. The expectancy inter-
est that Cowns in the reversion can also be totally defeated if: (1) C 
predeceases O; (2) 0 transfers the reversionary interest in Blackacre 
to another person during his life; or (3) 0 devises the reversionary 
interest to another person by will. Similarly, the expectancy interest 
may be partially defeated by the birth of siblings or if O transfers 
only a portion of the reversionary interest to another person by inter 
vivos conveyance or by will. 
A difference between this equitable contingent remainder and 
this expectancy interest in this reversion concerns the possibility of 0 
dying leaving a surviving spouse. Theoretically, C's equitable con-
. tingent remainder may be less vulnerable to defeat by the surviving 
spouse than C's expectancy interest. The surviving spouse may, by 
statute in some states, 127 or by court-made law in other states, 128 
claim a forced share against the trust corpus. In nearly all states, 
however, the surviving spouse would receive at least a portion of the 
property found in the probate estate. 129 In this example, even if the 
state provides only for a spouse's statutory share of the probate es-
tate, it will have no effect on C's interest; in order for the reversion-
ary interest to pass through the probate estate and become 
possessory and available to the surviving spouse, C would have had 
to predecease O - and that would in itself defeat his expectancy 
interest. 
The enjoyment a person derives from owning either of these two 
interests before possession is also nearly identical. Although in most 
states the equitable contingent remainder can be gratuitously trans-
ferred by quitclaim deed and the expectancy interest cannot, the ex-
pectancy interest can effectively be gratuitously transferred by 
warranty deed. 130 Moreover, in a few states, neither a contingent 
remainder nor an expectancy interest can be gratuitously transferred 
127. See, e.g., N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUST LAW§ 5-1.l(b)(l)(E) (McKinney 1967); N.D. 
CENT. CODE§ 30.l-05-02{l)(a) (Supp. 1979); UPC§ 2-202(l)(i). 
128. See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); I A. Scorr, Sllpra note 
106 at § 57.5. 
129. See, e.g., ILL. REV. CODE§ 2-l(a)-(c) (1977); UPC§ 2-102. 
130. If the transfer is supported by full and adequate consideration, the expectancy interest 
can be transferred by quitclaim. 
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inter vivos by quitclaim deed. 131 The differences in enjoyment 
would therefore be almost nonexistent. 
Moreover, not all interests injured by a living probate finding of 
will validity are mere expectancies. Consider the following example: 
0 dies leaving a valid will containing the provision: "I devise Black-
acre to A for life and then to such of A's children as A shall appoint by 
will, and in default of appointment to B." A thereafter executes a ~ill 
that appoints Blackacre to his child C. 
A owns a special power of appointment that can only be exercised by 
a valid will. B owns a vested remainder subject to defeasance by the 
valid exercise of the power by A. At the time A offers a will for 
living probate, B's interest falls within the class of traditional prop-
erty interests. Yet under the Administrative Model, B would not be 
given notice or the opportunity to appear at an ante-mortem probate 
proceeding determining the validity of A's will. Thus, even under 
the criteria established by its proponents, the Administrative Model 
should be amended to provide notice to default takers. 
Finally, Mullane should apply to a living probate procedure be-
cause, even assuming the interests adjudicated at _the time of the pro-
ceeding are mere expectancies, the adjudication will, after the 
testator's death, bind persons who would have owned traditional 
property interests but for the prior ex parte proceeding. 132 Alexan-
der and Pearson reject this analysis by asserting that the property 
right arises only after probate is completed. They argue :first that 
since the state can define the right to inherit, the state also possesses 
the right to decide when the property right comes into existence: 133 
Inheritance through testate or intestate succession . . . is simply a 
state-supervised gift. Until the gift is completed, the expectant recipi-
ent has no greater property rights than the expectant recipient of an 
inter vivos gift. Under our probate system, the succession rights of ex-
pectant heirs and legatees do not receive formal legal recognition until 
(I) a will has been admitted to probate, or (2) the existence of a valid 
131. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS§§ 394-96, 1858-59 (2d 
ed. 1956). 
132. See id, at 1858-59. 
133. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 102. The Court in Simons v. Miami 
Beach National Bank, 381 U.S. 81, 85 (1965), accepted this theory for dower rights. The issue 
will be discussed further at note 139 iefra and accompanying text. 
Fixing the time that the property rights arise after formal probate is completed is important 
to Alexander and Pearson for two reasons. First, it eliminates any claim that by accelerating 
the adjudication of the validity of the will, the presumptive takers are denied due process 
protection that they would otherwise enjoy. Second, if their constitutional analysis is accepted 
as correct, reforms to reduce procedural requirements and inefficiencies in probate administra-
tion after the decedent's death could doubtless be implemented. For example, the UPC has 
promulgated in §§ 3-301 to -306 an informal probate proceeding that is ex parte and is very 
similar to the probate in common form that existed in England and that is already in effect in 
several states today. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 18, at §§ 93-95. 
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will has not been established and the establishment of any later discov-
ered will is barred by the law.134 
The flaw in this analysis is that the law in the various states does 
not clearly define inheritance as arising after a state approves or re-
jects a will. Heirship status under an intestacy statute is determined 
immediately after a decedent's death. If an heir should die before 
completion of probate, his share of the decedent's estate passes to the 
beneficiaries under his will or to his intestate heirs.135 Alexander 
and Pearson acknowledge that states have many laws in which rights 
of succession takers are recognized upon the decedent's death; they 
attribute these laws to "administrative convenience and necessity"136 
only. 
Secondly, Alexander and Pearson argue that, until probate is 
complete, the property right is so contingent that it should not be 
raised to the level of a protectible property interest.137 That probate 
is required to determine whether the decedent died intestate or tes-
tate and to determine and pay taxes and other debts does not neces-
sarily lead to a conclusion that no property interest arises until after 
probate is completed. All the facts necessary to resolve the questions 
arising at probate, especially whether the decedent died testate or 
intestate, are known or knowable as of the time of the decedent's 
death. The law provides all the necessary criteria for determining 
who should share in the decedent's estate. That such a determina-
tion has not yet been made should not lead to the conclusion that no 
property interests exist. 
Contrary to the argument made by Alexander and Pearson, this 
aspect of a testamentary transfer distinguishes it from an inter vivos 
gift. Unlike the uncompleted gift where the donor has not yet en-
tered into a legal transaction, at the decedent's death, the decedent 
no longer owns the property - a transfer has occurred. All that 
remains to be done is to apply the various rules of law to determine 
who is the recipient of the transfer. To deny the expectant heir op-
portunities to present relevant evidence and to ensure correct appli-
cation of the rules of law arbitrarily imposes a financial loss on 
him.138 
134. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 98. 
135. Even if no law in a particular state provides that property rights arise at the time of 
the decedent's death, a claim that they arise at that time may derive from rules and proce-
dures that raise the claimants' expectations. This idea of expectations arising through "de 
facto" procedures is seen in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In addition, see Van 
Alstyne, supra note 126, at 455. 
136. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 98 n.31. 
137. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 111. 
138. The very act of dealing with what purports to be an "individual case" without first 
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Hanson v . .Denckla139 supports this analysis. In Hanson, the 
Court found that Florida lacked jurisdiction in a post-mortem pro-
bate proceeding over a Delaware trustee, and therefore, that Dela-
ware could ignore a Florida judgment. The Court relied upon the 
due process clause to determine the fairness of Florida's assertion of 
jurisdiction. The Court's analysis applied inferentially to all nonres-
ident will beneficiaries or intestate takers. 140 The Court necessarily 
found that these parties owned a property interest protected by the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 141 
If a protectible property interest arises, at the latest, when the 
decedent dies, litigating the validity of the decedent's will before 
death in a binding declaratory judgment proceeding would seem 
also to require due process protection for the presumptive takers. 
Although the interest is subject to more contingencies than after the 
decedent's death, it would seem that the differences in the quality of 
the interest are not so important as to warrant a constitutional dis-
tinction. To hold otherwise would mean that a testator could unilat-
erally destroy an individual's right to inherit upon petitioning the 
court to recognize his will as valid. 142 
Alexander and Pearson are correct in identifying the law of suc-
cession as a statutory creation. "Nothing in the Federal Constitution 
forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish 
the power of testamentary disposition over property within its juris-
diction." 143 The states have the power and in fact frequently repeal 
existing intestate succession statutes and enact new ones that provide 
for different distributive schemes.144 Similarly, the state has the 
affording the person involved the protection of a hearing offends the concept of basic fairness 
that underlies the constitutional due process guarantee. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 
20 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
139. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). This argument appears inconsistent with the Simons case in 
which the Court, relying on Florida law providing that no dower right survived an ex parte 
decree of divorce, held that the spouse could not claim dower at the probate of her ex-hus-
band's estate. Reading Simons and Hanson together, however, suggests that a testator, by 
merely petitioning a court to determine the validity of a will during his life, may destroy a 
protectible property interest. Formulating the issue in this way, the Court is unlikely to rely on 
Simons and to uphold the constitutionality of the Administrative Model. 
140. 357 U.S. at 259 (Black, J., dissenting). 
141. The same inference can be drawn from other earlier Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning probate decrees. See, e.g., Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942). 
142. See Currie, supra-note 67, at 36, in which the author predicts that the Supreme Court 
would not permit "a state to dispense with notice if a man sued simply to extinguish his wife's 
expectancy of a statutory share in his estate." 
143. Irving Trust v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942). See also Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 490 (1850); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 
625 (1896). 
144. For example, in recent years, states have enlarged the share of the estate going to the 
1104 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:1066 
power to increase the requirements for executing a valid will and the 
power to create rights in certain persons, such as a spouse or children 
of the decedent, to take a share of the estate contrary to the testa-
mentary scheme found in the will. To say that the state has the 
power to destroy a particular individual's expectancy interest in an-
other person's property is not to say, however, that if the state con-
tinues to recognize the individual's expectancy interest, it is not a 
protectible property interest. The entitlement cases beginning with 
Goldberg v. Kelly145 make this proposition clear. 
As they did with Mullane, Alexander and Pearson argue that the 
protectible property interests recognized in the entitlement cases are 
distinguishable and involve more substantial interests than the ex-
pectancy interests at stake in probate. Relying on Roth v. Board of 
Regents,146 Perry v. Sindermann, 147 Arnett v. Kennedy, 148 and Bishop 
v. Wood, 149 they identify two necessary requirements for finding that 
a governmentally conferred interest is the equivalent of property 
and, therefore, must be provided due process protection: (1) a pres-
ent enjoyment of that benefit and (2) state-induced reliance on its 
continuation in the absence of specific grounds for termination or 
disqualification. 150 To these two requirements, I would add that the 
specific statute or regulation creating the benefit is the exclusive 
source that determines who the state intended to benefit and upon 
· what conditions the benefit can be terminated. 
Alexander and Pearson argue that the expectancy interests 
owned by the presumptive takers fail to meet the requirements of 
present interest and reliance: 
[D]espite such statutory provisions, neither category of potential takers 
can claim present use or enjoyment of the decedent's property. Their 
interests are wholly prospective and lack recognition as existing prop-
erty rights. Indeed, to use the more vivid language of the Supreme 
Court in Roth, their interests represent nothing more than an abstract 
desire for the decedent's property or a unilateral expectation of a right 
to it. For constitutional purposes, a property right arises, if at all, when 
the inquiry into the existence of a valid will has been completed and 
rules of succession have been applied. Only then are the prerequisites 
of the entitlement cases, particularly that of justifiable reliance, satis-
surviving spouse and have reduced the share of the estate going to the decedent's issue, par-
ents, siblings, and other collateral heirs. 
145. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In addition, see Currie, supra note 67, at 35-36. 
146. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
147. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
148. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). 
149. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
150. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 105. 
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fied.1 51 
Alexander and Pearson apply these criteria too literally and, most 
importantly, ignore the specific statutes creating the inheritance 
rights. The mere fact that an individual does not presently possess 
property does not mean that he does not presently enjoy ownership 
of that property.152 That his right to future possession (in the case of 
an expectancy interest) is subject to many conditions and contingen-
cies makes it less valuable than an indefeasibly vested remainder. 
But no one would argue that the latter, which is also a creature of 
state law, is not a protectible property interest. Alexander's and 
Pearson's arguments as to the lack of state created reliance is sim-
ilarly flawed. The state, through the intestate succession statute and 
the will execution statute, has induced reliance. The intestate succes-
sion statute identifies certain classes of persons who are eligible to 
share in the decedent's estate if he dies without leaving a valid will. 
The will statute provides the requirements for a valid will. An indi-
vidual qualifying as an heir under the intestate statute is induced by 
the state to rely upon the inheritance absent the execution by the 
testator of a valid will. 153 The valid will is the specific ground for 
termination identified in the statute. In accordance with state law, 
whethe:r or not a valid will exists depends on whether the decedent 
possessed mental competency and was free from fraud and undue 
influence at the time the will was executed. Thus, the expectancy 
interest can only be terminated if these individualized factual issues 
are resolved. Because the expectancy interest meets the require-
ments of an entitlement, those factual issues must be resolved in a 
proceeding that satisfies the due process clause. 
Emphasizing the statutory provisions creating the benefit, rather 
than the quality and nature of the right at stake, seems correct in 
light of the entitlement cases. A review of two of these cases illus-
trates this conclusion. In O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 154 
elderly residents of ~ nursing home claimed to have a constitutional 
right to a hearing before a state or federal agency could revoke the 
151. Id at 107-08. 
152. Alexander and Pearson may be limiting entitlements to rights that are presently pos-
sessed rather than merely presently owned. This restriction would be erroneous. Entitlements 
are a recognition that governmental largess is equivalent to traditionally recognized property 
rights. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 
(1964). Since traditional property rights need not be possessory, entitlements should also not 
need to be possessory. 
153. A similar analysis applies with respect to beneficiaries named in an existing valid will. 
Under the will statutes, they are induced by the state to rely upon the inheritance absent the 
execution by the testator of a valid will. 
154. 100 S. Ct. 2467 (1980). 
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certification of the nursing home facility. The nursing home had 
been certified by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
[HEW] as a "skilled nursing facility." It thereby became eligible to 
receive payments from HEW and from the state Department of Pub-
lic Welfare [DPW] for providing nursing care services to aged, dis-
abled, and poor persons who were in need of medical care. The 
nursing home entered into formal provider agreements with the two 
governmental agencies in which HEW and DPW agreed to reim-
burse the nursing home for care provided to persons eligible for 
Medicare or Medicaid benefits on the condition that the nursing 
home continue to qualify as a skilled nursing facility. The Court 
held that the Medicaid provisions "do not confer a right to continued 
residence in the home of one's choice . . . . [W]hile a patient has a 
right to continued benefits to pay for care in the qualified institution 
of his choice, he has no enforceable expectation of continued benefits 
to pay for care in an institution that has been determined to be un-
qualified."155 By virtue of the statutory and regulatory scheme, the 
elderly patients were presently enjoying residence in the nursing 
home and had relied on its continuing qualification absent a showing 
that it was no longer a "skilled nursing facility." Nevertheless, the 
statute did not expressly provide that the elderly patients had a 
"right to continued residence" and, therefore, it was not a statutorily 
created benefit enjoying due process protection. 
Bishop v. Wood1 56 also illustrates the Court's reliance on the stat-
ute creating the benefit to identify an entitlement. The petitioner 
had been employed as a policeman by the City of Marion, North 
Carolina. The tenure of his employment was based on a city ordi-
nance. The ordinance was ambiguous - it could have been read 
both as guaranteeing employment absent cause for dismissal and as 
granting no right to continued employment. Although the ordinance 
had not been interpreted by a North Carolina court, a United States 
district judge held that the latter interpretation was the correct one. 
The Supreme Court accepted this interpretation of the ordinance. 
The Court held that the policeman's employment was not a pro-
tectible interest and, therefore, that it did not enjoy due process pro-
tection. The fact that the statute was ambiguous and may have 
induced reliance by the employee was not relevant. The government 
retained control over both whom it intended to benefit and the con-
155. 100 S.Ct. at 2475. 
156. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). In addition, see Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972). 
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ditions upon which it could terminate those benefits. 157 
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Administrative 
Model may be constitutional if it is viewed as changing the substan-
tive law of wills. Although some inquiry into testamentary capacity 
and lack of fraud and undue influence is conducted in the ex parte 
proceeding, these issues are not necessarily relevant to a finding of a 
valid will. Instead, a state may define a valid will to be an instru-
ment approved by a court after submission by the testator. Under 
the Administrative Model, however, the court does not have absolute 
discretion in judging will validity. Alexander and Pearson seem un-
prepared to change the substantive law of wills by eliminating the 
requirements of testamentary capacity and freedom from fraud and 
undue influence. To the contrary, the Administrative Model estab-
lishes a procedure by which these factual issues are adjudicated. 
Thus, so long as the state law continues to require a valid will (de-
fined as a document executed by a decedent with mental competency 
who was free from fraud and undue influence) to defeat the statuto-
rily created expectancy interests, a protectible property interest ex-
ists. And because it exists, a proceeding with adequate safeguards is 
required to resolve the issue of whether or not a valid will exists. 
Even if the expectancy interests of presumptive takers are enti-
tled to due process protections, the constitutional analysis remains 
incomplete. The procedures available to the expectant takers under 
the Administrative Model might satisfy the mandates of due proc-
ess.158 In Mathews v. E!dridge, 159 the Supreme Court articulated the 
balancing aproach that it will follow in determining the procedural 
safeguards required: 
Our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates 
of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
157. See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property'~ 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 
(1977); Saphire, Spec!lj,ing .Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Proce-
dural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978); Van Alstyne, supra note 126. 
158. The Court employs a balancing test to determine whether state procedures satisfy due 
process. See Barry v. Barchi, 433 U.S. 55 (1979) (suspension violated due process by lack of 
assurance of a prompt postsuspension hearing); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. I (1979) (Mas-
sachusetts' statute requiring suspension of driver's license for refusal to take a breath-analysis 
test after arrest did not violate due process); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Croft, 436 
U.S. I (1978) (due process requires both opportunity to complain of excessive utility charges 
and notice to customers of the procedure for contesting bills); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976) (evidentiary hearing prior to initial termination of social security disability benefits 
not required by due process). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 
15, at 498-503; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's .Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudi-
cation in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 28 (1976). 
159. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation and such interests through 
the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and the administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements 
would entail. 160 
Identifying the procedures required by this balancing test is difficult; 
the standard inevitably leads to uncertainty in adjudication. 161 
Whether the Administrative Model provides sufficient procedural 
safeguards is therefore difficult to predict. 
That an individual's financial security does not typically hinge 
upon the right to inherit (unlike welfare payments, public sector 
licenses, and many entitlements) implies that, under the Eldridge 
formula, the probate procedure need not include a full-trial-type 
hearing. 162 Along with recognizing that a deprivation of the expec-
tancies of presumptive takers is unlikely to cause severe financial in-
security for presumptive takers, the Court, in accordance with 
Eldridge, 163 will also weigh heavily the good-faith judgment of the 
legislature that the procedure assures fair consideration of the claims 
of presumptive takers. But despite the relative unimportance of 
these property interests and the presumption in favor of the adopted 
procedure, the Court might invalidate the elimination of all notice 
and opportunity for a hearing unless there is some altemativ~ proce-
dure to assure representation of the interests of the presumptive tak-
ers. 
Looking to the Mullane case for an analogous situation, the 
Court held that the state could not eliminate notice by mail for pres-
ent income beneficiaries even though the statute provided for the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem to represent absent persons who 
might have any interest in the income of the trust fund at issue. For 
-holders of more remote interests, the Court varied the form of notice, 
allowing notice by publication rather than by mail, after balancing 
the nature of the property interest at stake against the cost and delay 
in the administration of the common trust fund. From this case, due 
process seems to require notice and an opportunity to appear. Un-
like the proceeding in Mullane, presumptive takers cannot appear at 
the living probate proceeding under the Administrative Model. Also 
unlike Mullane, the guardian ad litem in the Administrative Model 
acts only as an objective investigator rather than an advocate repre-
160. 424 U.S. at 334-35. 
161. See]. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 502-03. 
162. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing'', 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
163. 424 U.S. at 349. 
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senting the presumptive takers' interests. The lack of notice and 
hearing under the Administrative Model may therefore violate the 
due process clause of the Constitution. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO LIVING PROBATE 
Over the last fifty years, commentators have suggested numerous 
statutory reforms designed to eliminate or to reduce unfounded con-
tests based on claims that testators lack mental capacity to execute 
their wills. The proposals for living probate are only the most recent 
of the suggested statutory reforms. I believe that these and other 
proposals fail because they assume that mental capacity must remain 
an essential prerequisite to execution of a valid will. Below I chal-
lenge that assumption - I refute John Langbein's claim that "[n]o 
one seems to believe that the substantive law of testamentary capac-
ity is misguided .... " 164 In short, I suggest that the benefits de-
rived from requiring mental capacity are insufficient to justify the 
costs of adjudicating mental capacity in probate courts. 
Statutes in every American jurisdiction require that testators pos-
sess a minimum mental capacity at the time they execute their 
wills. 165 Yet few courts or scholars have ever explained why a testa-
tor's mental competency is an appropriate prerequisite to a validly 
executed will. 166 Obviously, most people instinctively feel that men-
tally incompetent individuals should not be allowed to dispose of 
their wealth by will. They are troubled by the possibility that, for 
example, a mental incompetent would able to give property at death 
to a frivolous organization rather than to family members. They are 
uneasy not necessarily because the distribution is unfair in the ab-
stract, but because the testator inay be mentally incapable of evaluat-
ing the fairness of the distribution. Thus, the requirement of mental 
capacity protects testators from their own irrational testamentary 
dispositions. 167 The requirement also protects the testator's family 
and society generally by invalidating irrational dispositions that 
would force families to become wards of the state.168 
Some commentators suggest that the primary function of the 
164. Langbein, supra note 12, at 66. 
165. The first Statute of Wills enacted in England did not refer to the mental capacity of 
the testator. 32 Hen. VIII, c. I (1540). This omission was corrected two years later by amend-
ments providing that an instrument executed by an "idiot or, by any person de non sane mem-
ory" was not a valid will. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5, § 14 (1542). 
166. For a rare exception, see Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incom-
petency, 38 MICH. L. REv. I 189 (1940). 
167. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 233. 
168. See id at 232-33; Green, supra note 166, at 1204-07, 1211-12, 1216-18. 
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mental capacity requirement is to protect the family; they discount 
its importance in protecting the testator. Further, they assert that the 
requirement harms testators more than it protects them because tes-
tators fear the- personal malignment and disturbance of their rea-
soned testamentary plan that the requirement permits. 169 That latter 
fear is warranted; the mental capacity requirement protects families 
from disinheritance at the cost of allowing courts to police the fair-
ness of distributions. 170 
I propose to remedy these problems by abolishing the mental ca-
pacity requirement and providing a statutory election to those we 
most fear may suffer in the event of disinheritance. 171 First, states 
should amend their will execution statutes to eliminate the require-
ment of testamentary capacity at the time of execution. Second, 
common-law property states should extend the surviving spouse's 
right to elect a statutory share to minor children of the decedent 
whenever there is no surviving spouse or the surviving spouse is not 
the children's parent. 172 In community property states, whenever 
there is no surviving spouse or the surviving spouse is not the chil-
dren's parent, minor children should receive a share of both the com-
munity property and the separate property found in the decedent's 
estate. If a spouse and minor children who are also the children of 
the spouse survive the decedent, common-law property states should 
increase the elective share going to the spouse to take into account 
the increased expenses of rearing the children. 173 Community prop-
erty states should similarly increase the amount going to the surviv-
169. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 232-34, 246-47; Note, Testamentary Capacity in a Nut-
shell; A Psychiatric Reevaluation, supra note 25, at 1123-24 (1966). See generally, Cavers, supra 
note 4. 
170. See text at notes 20-39 supra. 
171. For an alternative to my proposal, see Epstein, supra note 21. Epstein, a Philadelphia 
attorney, proposes that legislatures should sever the issue of testamentary capacity from the 
issue of fairness and reasonableness of the distribution. Epstein proposes "Family Mainte-
nance Legislation" that allows a court to exercise its discretion in providing satisfactory main-
tenance for persons designated by the statute. The court would inquire into the fairness of the 
disposition only after finding that the testator possessed testamentary capacity, without refer-
ence to the "naturalness" of the dispository scheme. Unless narrowly designed, this proposal 
could limit the testamentary freedom of the testator as much as or more than sustaining the 
claim of testamentary incapacity through inappropriate determinations of "unnaturalness." 
The proposal actually only codifies the courts' power to apply a fairness standard that they 
already apply. Moreover, this proposal fails to protect the testator against maligning allega-
tions of mental incompetency. Claimants not protected by the family maintenance legislation 
would continue to challenge the will for lack of other recourse. Even claimants protected by 
the family maintenance legislation might attack the will on testamentary incapacity grounds. 
In addition, see England's Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, ch. 
63. 
172. The amount of the children's share should depend upon the value of the estate, If one 
child survives, the first $50,000 and one thir4 of the remaining estate would seem adequate. If 
more than one minor child survives, perhaps they should receive the entire estate. 
173. Distributing the property to the surviving spouse instead of to the children eliminates 
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ing spouse if the decedent's children are also the children of the 
spouse. My proposal excludes adult children because, although they 
are natural objects of the testator's bounty, their livelihood rarely 
depends on the decedent. Restricting testamentary freedom to pro-
vide for those without :financial dependency seems unjustified. 174 
Moreover, providing adult children a statutory share might reduce 
their incentive to take care of their sick or elderly parents. 175 
This approach to the problem of unwarranted allegations of tes-
tamentary incapacity is far preferable to living probate. It eliminates 
any need to inquire into the testator's mental competency. The elec-
tive share to the surviving spouse and/ or minor children only 
slightly increases the restrictions on testamentary freedom already 
existing in the law. Often persons who die testate no longer have 
minor children, and most states already provide some form of elec-
tive share for the spouse. Further, the benefits to the testator of 
knowing that presumptive takers cannot challenge the will on 
grounds of mental incompetency outweigh the cost of forfeiting con-
trol over the disposition of part of the estate. 
This proposal rests on the conclusion that, after protecting the 
nuclear family, society has little or no interest in imposing the re-
quirement of mental competency.176 Although it does not provide a 
the need to appoint a guardian in cases where the surviving parent will likely care for the 
children. 
174. I do not propose a statute that permits persons who show financial dependency upon 
the testator to claim a share of the estate; that would encourage litigation and further encum-
ber probate administration. Rather, I propose a conclusive presumption of dependency based 
on certain familial relationships. 
175. If they know they can never be totally disinherited they may not be so willing to give 
their parents care and affection when they are sick and elderly. To the extent my proposal may 
create some disincentive to care for an irrational parent because that parent could disinherit 
the adult child, I think that the possibility of being included in the will may still encourage the 
child not to abandon his parents. 
Although not a necessary aspect of my proposal, I think that the elective share of the 
spouse and the minor children should operate not only against the probate estate but also 
against inter vivos transfers that are essentially will substitutes like the revocable inter vivos 
trust. Without going into detail, I agree with the theory of the augmented estate adopted in the 
Uniform Probate Code in which the elective share operates against probate and nonprobate 
property. I also agree with the aspect of the augmented estate under the Uniform Probate 
Code in which a transfer of property to the spouse prior to the decedent's death reduces the 
amount of the elective share. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 2-202. I also believe the statute 
should reflect that the elective share to a surviving spouse in nonco=unity property states 
rests not only on the presumption of financial dependency but also on the assumption that the 
spouse actively participated in the acquisition of the marital property. The statute should limit 
the amount or availability of the elective share if the surviving spouse just recently married the 
decedent or married the decedent late in life after the decedent had accumulated much of the 
property. 
176. The laws of succession protect against obviously wasteful dispositions independently 
of the testamentary capacity requirement. For example, courts will not permit an executor of 
an estate to carry out a testator's direction to dump cash into the ocean or to prevent real estate 
from remaining productive. See, e.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 
1112 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:1066 
perfect solution, it does balance protection of testamentary freedom 
against protection of presumptive takers. The testator forgoes some 
testamentary freedom by the provisions that give the surviving 
spouse and/ or minor children the right to elect against the will, 
while presumptive takers other than nuclear family members forgo 
their right to claim a share in the estate based on the testator's 
mental incompetency.177 This proposal is less complex, more fair, 
and better directed toward the problem of capacity-based contests 
than is living probate. 
State choice-of-law statutes that adopt the will execution statutes 
of another state do not also incorporate the testamentary capacity 
requirements of the other state. 178 The constitution does not man-
date extraterritorial recognition of my proposed statutory amend-
ment in most situations, and the proposal will therefore provide 
certainty against unwarranted attack only in those states that enact 
similar succession law rules. Thus, the general effectiveness of my 
proposal hinges upon its adoption in a large number of states. 179 
(1926); Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Brown v. Bur-
dett, 21 Ch. D. 667 (1882). See also Note, Wills-lJireclion in Will To Destroy Es/ale Property 
Violates Public Policy, 41 Mo. L. Rev. 309 (1976). The need to prevent wasteful dispositions 
therefore cannot be used to justify the mental capacity requirement. 
177. States that implement my proposal should eliminate the requirement of testamentary 
capacity for all testators who die after enactment of the amendment. Unlike new formal will 
requirements, this amendment can apply retrospectively. This application appears constitu-
tional under the Supreme Court case of Usury v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 
(1976). Although probably not constitutionally required, the statutory amendment should not 
apply to a will through which a testator exercises a power to appoint that the donor created 
prior to the statutory enactment. The donor of the power created it assuming it would only be 
exercised in a will by a person who possessed testamentary capacity. Fairness therefore re-
quires that testamentary capacity remains a prerequisite for wills that exercise powers granted 
before the enactment of the proposed amendment. Moreover, default takers own property 
interests that can be defeated only upon a valid exercise of the power. At the time those 
interests were created, the prerequisites to a valid will included the requirement of testamen-
tary capacity. Fairness suggests that the legal rule continue to be preserved for default takers 
who obtained their interests prior to the enactment of the propc,sed statutory amendment. 
Analogous to the interests owned by the default takers are possibilities of reverter or rights 
of entry. Statutes that limit the duration of these interests or that create special statutes of 
limitation or recording deadlines have been upheld, but the issue has not been decided by the 
United States Supreme Court. E.g., Trustees of Schools ofTownship No. 1 v.Batdorf,6111. 2d 
486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955); Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Socy., 186 Neb. 786, 186 
N.W.2d 907 (1971). Bui see Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 S.2d 727 (Fla. 1954); Board of 
Educ. of'Cent. School Dist. No. 1 v. Mills, 15 N.Y.S.2d 364,207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 
(1965). See also Comment, Removing Old Restrictive Covenants-An Analysis and Recommen-
dation, 15 KAN. L. Rev. 582 (1967). 
178. See note 103 supra. 
179. An alternative to this proposal is to preserve the right of spouses and minor children 
to allege testamentary incapacity and to deny them an elective share. This proposal is less 
attractive in that it involves expensive litigation without significant benefits to either the testa-
tor or nuclear family members. Testamentary freedom would be somewhat greater, but the 
risks that a testator's mental competency would be challenged also increase. The spouse 
and/or children may obtain a greater share of the estate by a finding of invalidity, but that 
difference would be reduced by litigation costs. 
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I believe the requirement of absence of fraud and undue influ-
ence should be retained. Unlike the testamentary capacity require-
ment, the requirement of absence of fraud and undue influence 
exists to deter wrongdoers and to assure that they do not benefit 
from their wrongdoing. If contestants could not challenge a will on 
the basis of fraud or undue influence, testators would have little pro-
tection from deception and duress. Retaining the requirement of ab-
sence of fraud and undue influence raises two major issues. First, 
will those persons who would otherwise allege testamentary incapac-
ity now allege fraud and undue influence and therefore reduce the 
usefulness of my proposal to abolish the mental capacity require-
ment? As noted earlier; most reported cases that contain allegations 
of testamentary incapacity also contain allegations of fraud and un-
due influence because deception and duress more easily influence a 
physically or mentally weakened testator. 180 Thus, the answer may 
very well be yes. On the other hand, courts that would otherwise use 
the requirements of fraud and undue influence to strike down seem-
ingly unfair dispositions will have less reason to do so if the nuclear 
family is entitled to a forced share of the testator's estate. 
A second issue concerns how states might best resolve issues of 
fraud or undue influence. I believe that the Uniform Probate Code's 
self-proving will procedure offers the best method. 181 Under this 
procedure, a testator can obtain a rebuttable presumption against 
fraud and undue influence upon presentation of the self-proved will 
to probate. This provides some protection to the testator as well as 
to intended legatees while still deterring wrongdoers. 
CONCLUSION 
The idea of determining the validity of wills during the lifetime 
of the testator carries superficial appeal. Not only might it provide 
the testator with greater assurance of testamentary disposition, it 
might also improve the quality and nature of the evidence available 
during probate. A critical review of the various living probate 
schemes reveals, however, that they fail to achieve these benefits, 
they impose significant costs on testators, and they inadequately pro-
tect the rights of presumptive takers. 
Discouraging challenges based on allegations of testamentary in-
capacity troubles me little except to the extent that the proposals fail 
to protect the nuclear family from total disinheritance. But a pro-
180. See text at note 55 supra. 
181. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§§ 2-504, 3-406. 
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bate proceeding that discourages challenges based on allegations of 
fraud and undue influence alarms me, because it encourages wrong-
doers to try to convince the testator to use the procedure. To the 
extent that living probate discourages challenges based on fraud and 
undue influence, it is both unwise and unfair to presumptive takers. 
Living probate cannot prevent all post-mortem challenges to a will; 
by slightly varying the basis of a fraud or undue influence allegation, 
presumptive takers can often challenge the court-approved will after 
the decedent's death. To the extent these issues remain litigable in a 
post-mortem proceeding, living probate fails in its promise of assur-
ing testators that their dispository scheme will avoid attack after 
their death. 
The primary purpose of this Article was to discourage the adop-
tion of living probate schemes. My own proposal for reform is of 
only secondary importance. In my opinion, living probate fails to 
advance the law of succession. And that failure impedes reform by 
creating the illusion that a problem has been corrected. 
